

JPRS-WER-85-012

2 February 1985

West Europe Report

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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2 February 1985

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ARMS CONTROL

FINLAND

SOVIET DEPUTY MINISTER: BALTIC AREA IN 'ZONE' POSSIBLE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Nov 84 p 11

[Text] At the main celebration of "Finnish-Soviet Friendship Month" in Tampere, Deputy Minister Aleksandr Iyevlev, who delivered the principal Soviet speech, declared that the Soviet Union is ready to discuss the issue of the conferral of nuclear-weapon-free status on the waters of the Baltic.

Iyevlev reminded his listeners of earlier statements by his country's leaders to the effect that the Soviet Union is ready to guarantee nuclear-free zone status for Northern Europe and to consider the question "of certain measures aimed at their own territory contiguous with the above-mentioned zone as well as to discuss the issue of conferral of nuclear-free status on the waters of the Baltic with the parties concerned."

The form is exactly the same as in the Finnish-Soviet political-level communique. The reason for repeating them seemed to be to stress the fact that Soviet scholar Lev Voronkov's slightly different interpretations, which have aroused notice, have not changed the official Soviet position.

In his latest book Voronkov says that nuclear-free status for the Baltic entails much broader ramifications than a nuclear-free Nordic zone.

Iyevlev is deputy minister of agriculture and he heads the Soviet delegation that has arrived here for the "Friendship Month" festivities. His speech repeated exactly the official Soviet positions on Finnish-Soviet relations.

According to Iyevlev, the relations that are built up on the basis of the Finnish-Soviet YYA are an important stabilizing factor in Northern Europe. They are of particular importance under the present international circumstances, "when aggressive elements in the United States and NATO are continuing to locate nuclear weapons in several Western European countries."

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CSO: 3617/21

ARMS CONTROL

NORWAY

ANTI-NUCLEAR, PRO-MILITARY GROUP LEADERS ARGUE ON ARMS

Group to Press 'Zone'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Dec 84 p 3

[Interview with Docent Eva Nordland by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] The call for an isolated, Scandinavian nuclear weapon-free zone has gone up again. It has been stated that the formation of such a zone would constitute an important step in the effort to create a larger European zone. A captivating idea, perhaps. But from other quarters issue warnings against a Scandinavian zone which is not a part of NATO's defense system. In reality, this is a very dangerous step. It is claimed that one would be wise not to undermine the NATO solidarity which has preserved the peace in Europe for 40 years. This may be especially true in the case of Norway and Denmark, which are perhaps particularly dependent upon allied help in a crisis situation. Docent Eva Nordland is among those who are actively working for a Scandinavian zone. "NATO has to accept our demands," she says, adding: "We will not be defended by nuclear weapons."

[Question] NATO does not want a Scandinavian nuclear weapon-free zone. How then shall negotiations regarding the formation of such a zone be carried out in the context of our defense alliances, Eva Nordland?

[Answer] NATO is involved in negotiations regarding their nuclear weapon strategy. In consultations with NATO, representatives from the Norwegian and Danish sides will persuade the alliance to accept our point of view.

[Question] Do you imagine a solution wherein there will be one separate defense strategy outside of the nuclear umbrella for the two Scandinavian countries--and another for the other NATO countries?

Pressure on NATO

[Answer] My point is that opposition to the use of nuclear weapons has been increasing ever since they were first deployed in Europe. At this

time the pressure on NATO to abandon their present nuclear weapon strategy is extremely great.

[Question] If we should say "no" to the alliance's present defense strategy, wouldn't we be well on our way out of NATO?

[Answer] We will neither leave NATO nor be thrown out. We are equal members in the alliance, and we are duty bound to work towards a new strategy for NATO. We are also duty bound to speak out and say that we will not be defended by nuclear weapons. This will be a major contribution towards a new defense strategy.

Imbalance

[Question] If NATO should abandon its nuclear weapons strategy, the West will be forced to engage in a major buildup of its conventional forces, in order to achieve approximate parity with the Soviet Union. What are your thoughts on this?

[Answer] The Soviet Union and the United States must negotiate. First a freeze, then a nuclear weapons builddown. A more stable balance must be struck.

[Question] And must this balance be achieved by means of the modernization of the conventional western forces?

[Answer] No, I do not desire conventional armament.

[Question] But the lack of a nuclear weapons strategy in combination with maintenance of the status quo with regard to conventional weapons in NATO will tip the balance further in favor of the Soviets.

[Answer] I do not see it that way. In my opinion, NATO will not lose by abandoning its strategy regarding first use of nuclear weapons. The Soviets must also guarantee that they will not use their nuclear weapons first either. There is also divided opinion as to whether or not a conventional weapons imbalance exists.

[Question] Is there?

[Answer] This is not my concern, this is not my field of expertise.

Blinders

Eva Nordland is fervent about her cause, but not ostentatiously. She expresses her opinions calmly and pleasantly. Her work in the peace movement began five years ago. She can even tell you the exact date, October 20, 1979:

"That was the day I read in the newspaper that the Labor Party government had considered agreeing to the deployment of medium-range NATO missiles in

Europe. At that point I felt I had to say 'no'. Since then, I have devoted all of my free time to the fight against nuclear weapons. In 1970 I thought that nuclear weapons were the most terrible thing in existence. And now that 'most terrible thing' is to be modernized..."

Eva Nordland has marched for peace since 1981: in Paris, the Soviet Union and Washington. The criticism that the marchers are equipped with blinders and a good deal of naivete has been heard from many quarters.

"Nothing is more realistic than to search for solutions to the tragedy which threatens our world. It is naive to say that Scandinavia must not take an independent step in the disarmament effort," states Mrs. Nordland.

[Question] Are you a pacifist?

[Answer] No, not with the way the world is today.

[Question] What kind of defense do you actually favor?

[Answer] A defense which is defensive in nature.

[Question] NATO will not fire a shot unless one of its member nations is attacked. You must agree that that is a "defensive" defense.

[Answer] Many people say that. But think about the offensive weapons which the alliance has, weapons which can penetrate deep into the Soviet Union if 'necessary'. It is true that NATO does not pursue an offensive military policy, but the weapons are offensive.

[Question] You participated in the conference in Copenhagen last weekend, where there was broad agreement on the formation of a Scandinavian nuclear weapon-free zone. What compensations do you feel should be required of the Soviets?

[Answer] Guarantees of non-attack from both superpowers. The Soviets must remove all medium-range missiles from Kola, along with any other nuclear weapons which are liable to be a threat to Scandinavia. I am also counting on Soviet concessions in the Baltic. Brezhnev stated in 1981 that significant concessions in the Baltic were possible.

[Question] What about submarines and other vessels which are equipped with nuclear weapons in area of Scandinavia?

[Answer] We must initiate a negotiation process which is as all-inclusive as possible.

[Question] How in the world are we to make sure that nuclear weapons are not posing a threat to Scandinavia?

[Answer] The superpowers have the means to monitor one another. In addition, a Scandinavian monitoring commission must be set up in cooperation with the UN. These are all things which must be included in the negotiations.

Soviet Trustworthiness

[Question] Would you trust a declaration of non-attack from the Soviets?

[Answer] I have read what experts in the United States think about these issues. They conclude that once the Soviets have made an agreement in which they have an interest, they will not break their word.

[Question] But they did just that in Afghanistan and in various eastern European countries.

[Answer] I am disheartened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I am also disheartened by the United State's involvement in Central America.

[Question] Do you consider the United States and the Soviet Union to be the same?

[Answer] They are not the same, but small nations should not have to suffer because of the superpowers' military strategies. This is my main point.

Neutrality

[Question] As early as the 1950s the Soviet government mouthpiece IZVESTIYA wrote that the establishment of a Scandinavian nuclear weapon-free zone could be the first step in the transition of all of the Scandinavian countries to neutrality!

[Answer] For me, this question is not on the agenda. I think that it is necessary to lay the foundation for friendly cooperation. It is senseless for two military blocks to stand there calling one another 'enemy'. We must create conditions conducive to extensive cooperation and peaceful coexistence," concludes the soft-spoken woman of peace.

Movement Wants Unilateral 'Disarmament'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Dec 84 p 3

[Interview with Regional Commissioner Alv Jakob Fostervoll by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] "The 'No on Nuclear Weapons' movement has become a total disarmament movement. It has reached the point we thought it would reach, and which we warned against. We experienced the fear created by this type of policy in the interval between the World Wars." These statements were made by the president of the Norwegian Defense Association, Regional Commissioner Alv Jakob Fostervoll, in an open interview with AFTENPOSTEN. The former Defense Minister goes on to warn strongly against the formation of a Scandinavian nuclear weapon-free zone. Fostervoll also has definite opinions on the freeze debate: "I consider this debate to be pretty unnecessary in that disarmament negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States are now beginning."

The Norwegian Defense Association is not impressed by the "No on Nuclear Weapons" report on a possible buildup in conventional NATO forces in order to make the defense alliance less dependent on having to defend itself with nuclear weapons.

The peace movement doubts that an increase in conventional arms in NATO would make the alliance less dependent on nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the fear that a conventional weapons buildup would only be in addition to the nuclear buildup which both sides have been carrying out in Europe already.

The Defense Association president feels that this position indicates quite clearly that the "No on Nuclear Weapons" movement has already become a pure disarmament movement. "It has moved from marketing fear of nuclear weapons to campaigning against conventional weapons as well. Of course modernization of the West's conventional forces would make us less dependent on nuclear weapons!"

"It is not radical to turn back to total disarmament or neutrality. Such measures provide no answers to the problems which face us all."

Fostervoll stresses that it is important to build as strong a conventional defense as possible in order to hinder the use of nuclear weapons. But, he points out, given the present military situation, NATO cannot be afraid to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent should someone threaten us.

Imbalance

[Question] Many people maintain that no significant imbalance exists between the two military superpowers as regard combat forces.

[Answer] The imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union is as great as three-to-one in some areas, in terms of weapons, aircraft and tanks. The imbalance is even greater in Scandinavia. In this context, I refer to analyses made by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. This is probably our best source of raw information.

[Question] The Russian soldier is not three meters tall?

[Answer] No, he is not. But the imbalance is apparent to anyone who considers the facts. Devious presentations cannot cover up this military imbalance. Over the last few years, all of the European NATO countries have been most reluctant to maintain their defenses and obtain new and better conventional weapons.

[Question] In this regard, how reluctant have the Warsaw Pact nations been?

[Answer] All of the information from the other side indicates that they are not reluctant. On the contrary. I should point out that I am inclined to believe the serious evaluations presented by experts and strategists in this area. I have an instinctual distrust of amateurs, stresses Alv Jakob Fostervoll.

Costly Modernization

[Question] Shouldn't NATO work to leave behind its present nuclear strategy?

[Answer] "That would be desirable. But this same conventional imbalance which I have pointed out makes us dependent upon the deterrent effect of our nuclear weapons. If we are to make ourselves less dependent upon nuclear weapons, an equally great deterrent effect must be achieved by means of our conventional forces! And that requires great economic resources. We have been unwilling to commit these resources in the interest of peace," says the Defense Association president and continues: "It would appear that the peace movement has lost its faith in peace. This is dangerous for a movement which represents so many people. Let it be made clear that our NATO countries have not been engaged in buildups in the old-fashioned sense, which is the impression one often receives in the course of this debate."

Minimum Defense

[Question] Then how have we armed ourselves?

[Answer] We have a minimum defense--a defense for peace. We trust that this system, working within an alliance of so many democratic countries, is equal to the task of preserving the peace in the future. The point behind NATO's possible first-use of nuclear weapons is deterrent. An enemy is uncertain as to whether or not he can gain his objective without the risk that he will be exposed to these weapons. If we abandon the first-use approach, a conventionally superior attacker will be presented with an easier problem to solve. He can be more sure of achieving his objective. On the other hand, the defenders are placed in an impossible situation.

The former Defense Minister from the Labor Party is not impressed by the freeze debate which now rages. "I consider this debate to be pretty unnecessary now, just as disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are beginning. These negotiations are difficult and complicated enough per se without our introducing proposals concerning freeze declarations into them."

"No" to Zone

The Norwegian Defense Association warns strongly against the formation of a Scandinavian nuclear weapon-free zone. "NATO solidarity must not be undermined. That solidarity has secured the peace in our part of the world ever since the last World War. It could be extremely dangerous to our security to set up an isolated Scandinavian zone which is not a part of NATO's defense system. How can we back out of an agreement such as that without it being taken as an unfriendly action?" asks Fostervoll, who maintains that once such a zone has been declared, there is no going back. "Furthermore, such a zone could be the first step towards the fulfillment of the Soviet government's old wish--namely, neutrality for all of the Scandinavian countries."

POLITICAL

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

CLOSER BONN-PARIS RAPPORT ON SECURITY, ECONOMIC ISSUES SEEN

French Attitudes More Positive

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 7 Dec 84 p 3

[Commentary by Kurt Becker: "A Paris-Bonn Axis? Impressions of the German-French Conference"]

[Text] Among the not yet worn out platitudes of the German-French cooperation is the finding that nothing in the European Community will get off the ground anymore except when Bonn and Paris try it jointly. It was by this experience in European unification politics that the Germans and the French gathered in Bonn the end of last week were primarily guided. The judgment rendered by official government representatives at this conference was that the balance sheet of the privileged neighborly cooperation was positive. The experts, on the other hand, politicians and diplomats, scientists and businessmen, at every attempt to go into detail and into banal reality, encountered only halfheartedness and terrible incongruities, without however leading the favorable overall assessment ad absurdum.

Contributing most to this promising assessment was an unmistakable change of opinion in France. Never before was the end of anti-Germanism so positively announced by the French in this circle. When the same debate sponsors--the Foreign Policy Institutes in Bonn and Paris, plus the German-French Institute in Ludwigsburg and its counterpart on the other side of the Rhine--took inventory a year ago in Berlin, the dominant feeling was the ominous distrust of the restless, albeit not unreliable Germans. The peace movement, and for that matter the whole debate about catch-up armament, worried the French. They believed that they might be witnessing the end of a German foreign policy which up to that time had been consistent, and feared the rise of an irrational neutralism and pacifism. And now this specter had been as good as dispelled.

The demand of the Elysee Palace most assuredly continues to be: To tie the FRG firmly to the West, especially to France, and to keep as large an influence as possible on happenings in Germany. Yet the French concern over the neighbor which stemmed from the distorted judgment of the year 1983 now goes hand-in-hand with the realization that, more than in the past, Paris must now lay more politically significant intentions on the table and must make more

concessions to the FRG than in the past, in order that Teutonic inconstancy will never even have a chance to assert itself and the integration of the FRG in the West becomes inescapable.

In the rather long neglected field of security policy, the realization grows that, despite the divergent defense doctrines of the NATO-member FRG and a France that continues to be concerned over its nuclear autonomy, overall strategic agreement on the threat and the security of both countries must be reached. Part of that is the continued coupling of Europe with America as well as a common policy with respect to the East, plus, as was heard from the French, the renunciation--meanwhile carried out--of a special relationship between Paris and Moscow. In the pragmatic field of military cooperation, the negotiations are progressing in very promising fashion, as State Secretary Lothar Ruehl assured.

In the striving for a community of destiny--more than a Paris-Bonn axis--the nuclear weapons topic can surely not be excluded on a long term basis. Surprisingly, however, the French today view the at first probably insoluble question of nuclear protection for the Federal Republic as much more problematical than we do. Nevertheless, the internal French debate points to considerable movement in their thinking. The French are looking for productive partial concessions to make to Bonn, if possible, naturally, without significantly renouncing their own nuclear doctrine. On the German side, however, there are hardly any specific expectations, least of all the speculation that France might be a substitute for America. It is more important to Bonn that Paris does not consider us to be only a frontier country bordering on the East. More important, too, is access to information on the principles and procedural rules of the French nuclear deterrence. Initially, however, interest is focused on willingness by France to support Bonn's position that the dependence on early employment of nuclear weapons should be reduced and the conventional defense capability increased. For that reason the formation of a rapid operational reserve of French conventional troops was appreciatively noted at the Bonn conference. At the same time, however, continued regret was expressed over the fact that France still does not want to commit itself on a time and place of military intervention in case defensive action should be necessary.

The essence of all this was: on the one hand, an enormously increased French realization of the necessity of a common security policy, and on the other the desire for a slowdown in the tempo of this thought process. The deep sigh of the leading Socialist security policy expert Jacques Huntzinger reflects this best of all: "After all that has been achieved, let us first of all catch our breath."

At the same time, the French effort to have still firmer ties was by no means limited to security policy matters. This effort extended to the continued evolution of the European Community into a political European Union, to the leveling of trade barriers, and a joint effort to overcome the technological gap. More serious than the pros and cons on the various issues were the theses of European Minister Roland Dumas and State Minister Alois Mertes. Mertes, especially, pointed out that Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand consider the

qualitative leap within the European Community imperative: namely the creation of the foreign policy-oriented European Union; if necessary, they plan to dictate the law of action themselves. Indeed, Bonn and Paris should, if all else fails, risk a government-level conference on the Union project on a reduced European Community scale. At least this would put pressure on the foot-draggers in the community.

Unavoidable at the conference was criticism of the incredible inadequacy of the Common Market, which is not nearly comparable with the achievements of the American domestic market that was originally aspired to. The criticism centered primarily on the huge technological lag, the elimination of which should give Germany and France combined at least the productiveness of Japan. In the process, everyone at the conference became aware of two things: for one thing, how little one can do without state aid and political initiative in research and development, and, for another, that France is in the lead in this field and Germany is dragging along behind.

The German-French discussion revealed deficits in all areas--from security policy to political union to technology. Surprisingly, though, the will for closer interdependence between Bonn and Paris is continually growing. Especially the conceptual impulse has received new impetus. It remains unresolved, however, if Kohl and Mitterrand can use this climate to advantage; whether they have the political strength to risk the qualitative lead into the European Union.

Strategic Issues Still Unclear

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Dec 84 p 10

[Commentary by Robert Held: "Shifting to a Faster Pace"]

[Excerpt] On the other hand, it is becoming ever clearer that something that could be confused with the nuclear guarantee complex is becoming more and more indispensable: a common estimate of the strategic situation, especially in the event of an initially conventional armed conflict and the coordination of the German armed forces with the non-NATO-integrated French forces which would then be necessary. In contrast to the other allies, these French forces exist as a reserve force for a conventional counterstrike. The question is: Are the calculations relevant to this subject still correct, i.e., will these forces even have the opportunity for a counterstrike, if the enemy has overrun territory so quickly in a lightning attack that one is already in the negotiating stage--or in an atomic war? This applies also to the role of the FAR--France's rapid action force. To intensify and accelerate the basically good and already long-standing cooperation in the area is the priority goal. This is also a prerequisite for what the Americans expect from us: that the defense of Europe becomes more European. According to Lothar Ruehl, Germany and France must direct their efforts toward the "conceptual convergence in the definition of European security questions."

Karl Kaiser called attention to a whole series of points that require clarification. With prior warning times getting shorter and shorter, everything far

back may perhaps be too far away: the French must define what their "Rapid Action Forces" could mean with respect to this; they have not yet resolved the contradiction between the defense of France along the Rhine and the defense of France along the Elbe, and this vagueness in turn influences the discussion in the FRG. Everything must be aimed at reducing the dependence on the early first employment of nuclear weapons--as a result of the failure of conventional defense. In addition, even though they realize that they cannot demand a nuclear guarantee, the Germans want to be informed how the French nuclear weapons are to be used. (With regard to American nuclear weapons, they gain insight in the Nuclear Planning Group.) On the other hand, a discussion at the present time about a nuclear guarantee by France for the FRG would lead to misunderstandings and a waste of time.

A French spokesman pointed out that the French deterrence undergoes a change through the numerical increase in warheads to 500. In this connection he also mentioned--analogous to the apparent absurdity of "flexible response" in general--that precisely the uncertainty of the nuclear guarantee constitutes a stabilizing force. Michael Stuermer remarked that one could not expect any great nation to hypothecate its existence.

Confusion in the Strategic Discussion

One Frenchman, to be sure, spoke of confusion in the French strategic discussion, especially as regards the definition of the function of the FAR. And yet the circumstances for German-French cooperation are seen as much more favorable than just a short time ago. The French hostility toward the Germans had almost completely disappeared, the spokesman said; the French plan to pull Germany out of NATO no longer existed; and the development of the debate over defense questions in France was likewise progressing favorably in this vein. France, too, is interested, he said, in arriving at a common assessment of military environmental conditions with the Germans, and this also included the joint all-weather reconnaissance satellite.

The Germans in turn concede that there is no point in demanding France's military integration into NATO. The question is simply how one can achieve a comparable result through other means: through other joint community agencies--such as the resurrected West European Union (WEU)--or through practical bilateral cooperation. To be sure, the French were also told that no one in France could conceive of the First French Army's still being able to defend France after the NATO troops had been defeated.

It became evident, at any rate, that the German-French cooperation--the closest that exists between two nations anywhere in the world--is in a new decision phase, in which the question will be in what form the two countries shall shift to another, faster speed.

This is true not only for defense, although models emerge precisely in this field for dealing with the matter as a whole. Cooperation in the field of advanced high technology has by now already become unavoidable, because costwise the necessary major projects would become too expensive for any one European country to bear by itself. France and the FRG together, on the other hand,

have a potential with which one can envision projects. But here, say the Germans--among whom at least the experts know what all the French can do better than they--not every joint major project should from the outset be overwhelmingly dominated by the French partner--as in the case of the Airbus or Ariane.

Anti-Germanism Waning

Bonn DIE WELT in German 3 Dec 84 p 4

[Commentary by Ruediger Moniac: "Paris Seeks Cooperation in Nuclear Strategy"]

[Excerpt] At the German-French conference last week in Bonn, leading scientist and politicians from both capitals spoke intensely about a military-political rapprochement of the two countries, and it appeared in the process as if the widely known inhibitions, especially on the part of the French, were on the wane.

A Frenchman, the deputy director of the French Institute for International Relations, Pierre Lellouche, did in fact present sensational theses. In his opinion, the "anti-Germanism" among the French was a thing of the past, as was antipathy toward NATO. The "enemy" in the French view was the Soviet Union, and France could no longer act as if it had a "neutralistic option" in Europe. In addition, the French had come to realize, he said, that, if they wished to maintain a capable armament industry, this would be possible only in cooperation with others.

Lellouche then went so far with other statements that many a German listener was struck by his undiplomatic language. First of all, he felt, France would hardly be able to avoid consultations with Germany over the employment of their own nuclear weapons. And secondly, the Frenchman left not the trace of a doubt that, from a French view, this appeared to be possible only if the Christian-Liberal [CDU-FDP] coalition remained at the helm in Bonn. For, Lellouche continued, if the German Social Democrats were to take over the government, "that would be the nail for the coffin of cooperation."

To date, no Frenchman versed in politics has so clearly defined the aversion that has developed in Paris since the SPD, following the end of its governing responsibility in Bonn, threw almost all security-political maxims overboard and, at the party congress last May in Essen, left Helmut Schmidt high and dry with the total condemnation of the NATO two-tracked resolution which in essence was conceived by the former SPD chancellor.

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CSO: 3620/181

POLITICAL

DENMARK

SDP POLITICAL SPOKESMAN AUKEN CLAIMS SCHLUTER VULNERABLE

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 2 Dec 84 p 12

[Article by Bjarne Kjaer]

[Text] There is no doubt in Svend Auken's mind, but a "no" to the nonsocialists is not enough---there must also be an alternative to support.

"We are prepared to oust the Schluter government at any time--especially if we have a chance to change the balance of power in parliament through an election," Social Democratic political spokesman Svend Auken told SONDAGS-AKTUELT.

He continued, "When we rejected a referendum on the government's policy toward the long-term unemployed, however, it was because of our fundamental criticism of national referenda on general economic and social legislation. In addition, it is impossible to slow down an austerity government by stopping it on one single issue."

"For this reason, we are not interested in creating a sudden parliamentary crisis, but we are interested in changing the position and attitude of the people. We will do this by making clear to them how the government's policies will affect them, how the government is letting our young people down, how the long-term unemployed are being pushed aside, and how the differences within Danish society are being intensified. We will show that there is an alternative to the nonsocialist government. In the next elections, the people will not simply shout "no" to the Schluter government and its austerity programs, but they will also say "yes" to something else--namely to the alternative that we, together with the labor movement, have presented.

We Can Learn From Nonsocialists

"In any event, there is one thing we in the opposition and in a future Social Democratic government can learn from the nonsocialists--to show unity. We have a nonsocialist government that many predicted would fall apart. In fact, the nonsocialists have stuck together, backed by the nonsocialist bastions of the press, the banks, finance, and business. They have demonstrated to us

the significance of unity. Hopefully, we will learn this lesson and demonstrate unity within the Social Democratic Party, between the party and the labor movement, and within the labor movement. This also means that those parties that want to support a future SDP government, such as SF (Socialist People's Party), must demonstrate loyalty and an ability to work with us. SF, for example, has said that Denmark must first withdraw from the EC and NATO before they will join the SDP in a coalition government. This is unrealistic, but if they do not want to take governmental responsibility, then SF must still be a loyal supporting party."

"For our part, we must not create expectations among the people that we are unable to fulfil. SF's changes in the budget would mean additional gross expenditures of 19.7 billion kroner. This money would be recovered by scrapping the military and withdrawing from the EC. Everyone knows that would be unrealistic, even if we received 90 percent of the vote. We must make realistic proposals, avoid trying to outbid our opponents, and stop taunting and kicking one another."

Exaggerated Unrest

Svend Auken said that reports of internal unrest within the Social Democratic Party were wildly exaggerated.

"It is unsatisfactory when an individual has a differing opinion, for which there should be room in a large party, and it is blown up to look like a split in the party. We must understand that the coverage of the labor movement does not occur on our terms, but on the terms of the nonsocialist press. For this reason, we must demonstrate consideration and loyalty toward the decisions made by the various congresses, the executive committee, and the parliamentary group. I have always supported the manner in which Anker Jorgensen leads the party, especially after the resolution approved by the congress in 1969, with open debate as the driving force within the party. As a result, we owe our loyalty to the party leadership to the extent that, once a decision has been made, we will back it up."

More Self-Confidence

"The Social Democrats should be more self-satisfied from time to time. We have reason to be. We should not be conceited, but more satisfied with ourselves. Self-confidence is catching, but having doubts about oneself is also catching. We need more positive contagion. The people should notice that the Social Democrats have confidence in their own ideas."

Must Shut Up

Concerning leaks in the Social Democratic group, Svend Auken said: "It has always been difficult to prevent leaks in the group. This makes the SDP group the most interesting at Christiansborg, but everyone must respect the fact that members must not leak reports. This is a source of enormous

irritation, but it is wrong to place a political label on such activities, as some have done. In fact, I do not believe at all in such labels as a center wing, a right wing, etc. Some people must learn to shut up. Purges and other actions in the worst Tehran tradition have never been our style. We are a democratic movement that does not use such methods," Svend Auken said.

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CSO: 3613/55

POLITICAL

DENMARK

END OF COFFEE CLUB SIGNALS BJERREGAARD'S ECLIPSE BY AUKEN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard]

[Text] Ritt Bjerregaard's coffee club has been disbanded. The internal tensions were too great and no real political discussion has occurred for several years. But she continues to debate women's and peace issues with other women within the party.

Ritt Bjerregaard's once-powerful coffee club has disbanded after languishing for several years. The president of the club held her prestigious position for 13 years before resigning and closing the doors to the club several days ago. The coffee club, previously so admired and so despised, was called a party within the party. Now it is a purely social gathering, if the former coffee club members choose to continue meeting in this way.

Ritt Bjerregaard formed the coffee club in 1971, when she was a newly elected member of parliament. The membership included other newly elected representatives: Svend Auken, Svend Jakobsen, Inge Fischer Moller, Karl Hjortnaes, and Helle Degn. Dorte Bennedsen later joined, following by Kaj Poulsen, and in 1977 Jimmy Stahr became a member. Kaj Poulsen left the club last summer. At that same time, Ole Lovig Simonsen was accepted as a new member.

Post Mortem

In actuality, Ritt Bjerregaard's coffee club was out of commission 1 year before its doors were closed. As early as 4 years ago, however, the first signs of friction appeared, at the close of the Social Democratic Party Congress. By an enormous quantity of legwork, the majority within the coffee club managed to get Inge Fischer Moller elected deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party, but Moller was not a unanimous choice. Svend Auken and Svend Jakobsen were against this choice and there was a struggle within the club.

There was more disagreement after the elections in December 1981. The question then was whether or not the Social Democratic government should continue to

rule after losing nine seats in the elections. Ritt Bjerregaard was among the winners. The government remained in power. When the government decided to step down in September 1982, however, there were more problems at the coffee club. These problems were further exacerbated during the period in opposition.

Fewer and fewer meetings were held. In order to give the coffee club a shot in the arm, rank-and-file member Jimmy Stahr was appointed chairman of the cultural committee (of the club) in order to make the coffee club a cultural society. Many films and plays were seen, but there was little political discussion.

It was also clear that it was a distinct disadvantage to the coffee club to have Ritt Bjerregaard, Svend Auken and Svend Jakobsen in the same room when the debate turned to the question of who should be Anker Jorgensen's successor.

Auken Favorite

Now that problem has solved itself. First of all, the coffee club has disbanded. Secondly, Svend Auken is the undisputed candidate. Thirdly, Ritt Bjerregaard is now keeping a very low profile.

Since the hotly contested elections at the Social Democratic Party Congress in September, in which Ritt Bjerregaard's two candidates Helle Degn and Inge Nesgaard lost, little has been heard from the former coffee club president. But she continues to debate women's and peace issues with other women in the party. These include Jytte Hilden, Helle Degn and Inge Nesgaard.

Other SDP Clubs

Ritt Bjerregaard's coffee club has been the most famous of the many Social Democratic coffee clubs. This is because of its former sharp political profile. The other coffee clubs have always been more social in nature, although Erling Olsen's coffee club at Christiansborg also has its political sides. The "Olsen Gang" includes Mogens Lykketoft, Soren Norgaard Sorensen, Bernhardt Tastesen, J. K. Hansen, Knud Heinesen and Bjorn Westh. Now, however, some of the rank-and-file members want to be spared from having the coffee club labeled a "party faction."

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CSO: 3613/55

POLITICAL

DENMARK

FAEROES' PARLIAMENT FACING ISSUES CONCERNING TIES WITH DENMARK

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 10-11 Nov 84 p 10

[Editorial: "Now the Die Will Be Cast"]

[Text] The Faroese have control over the elements. On several small rocky hills, which protrude from the Atlantic Ocean in an almost unnatural manner, they have created one of the richest societies in the world, with a level of ambition that seems to be inversely proportional to the number of inhabitants. The supply of goods available in the stores indicates that many are well off and few have too little. This assertion is confirmed by the fleet of automobiles on the island, which corresponds to three vehicles per household.

A well-developed and expensive network of roads is available. The Faroese are even spending 35 million kroner to construct a tunnel that will connect the few houses in Trollanaes on Kalsoy with the rest of that sparsely populated island. This project, by Danish standards, would correspond to four or five bridges across the Great Belt.

The foreign debt has tripled during the past 4 years and is now, on a per-capita basis, about twice the Danish debt, which is serious enough. But the Faroese are not panicking because of this. They are confident that the major investments in recent years in freighters and other equipment will bring in foreign exchange in the long run. The new government wants to put a ceiling on borrowing, but it will be extremely careful in slowing growth and development, which are intended to make the Faroes less dependent on fishing--and on Denmark.

With only two seats changing ownership, the political picture after Thursday's parliamentary elections seems extremely stable. For an outsider, even before the elections, it was difficult to see any major differences among the six parties. As a result, it is difficult to say exactly which political positions were victorious in the elections.

The Republican Party (an extreme, populist socialist secession party) seems to be the most left-oriented. The party compares itself to SF (Socialist People's Party) in Denmark. Nevertheless, the party's leader, Erlendur Patursson, has pointed to the possibility of forming a coalition with the Social Democrats

(a moderate socialist home rule party) and the People's Party (a conservative, pro-independence party). The latter is the party of the big shipowners. Politically and economically, it is close to the Conservative Party in Denmark.

On the other hand, it is apparently impossible for the two parties that would seem to be closest to each other--the People's Party and the Union Party (a moderate liberal, pro-Denmark party), which are included in the Liberal Party group in the Danish parliament--to continue their previous cooperation for an additional 4 years.

The primary reason is the second dimension in Faroese politics: the parties' positions on ties with Denmark. On this issue, the political spectrum ranges from the Republican Party, which is the ultimate secessionist party, over the People's Party, which also has secession in its program, to the Social Democrats and the Independence Party (a moderate liberal home rule party), both of which want greater independence within the Danish community, and on to the Union Party, which is 100 percent satisfied with the present arrangement.

In this regard, it may be said that the election results had only an insignificant influence on the previous balance. The two middle parties on this issue, the Social Democrats and the Independence Party, traded one seat and the People's Party took one seat from the Union Party.

But almost regardless of what government coalition emerges from the upcoming negotiations, it is certain that the Faroese will demand that the Danish government revise the home-rule legislation.

A majority, under the leadership of future Prime Minister Atli Dam, want to transfer additional areas of responsibility into the hands of the Faroese. This desire is based, among other things, on the rigorous interpretation of the existing laws by "King Niels," chief Danish executive officer Niels Bentsen. In addition, they will ask for a simplification of state grants to the Faroe Islands, so that Faroese politicians will have greater discretionary freedom.

First of all, however, we may expect a proposal in the near future on the sensitive issue of mineral rights. A solution must be found during the next 4 years, according to Atli Dam.

So far, the two sides have been deadlocked in a discussion over the formal ownership rights. A majority in the Faroese parliament demands full Faroese sovereignty.

To date, this has been totally rejected by various Danish governments. The message sent to the Faroese parliament has been that the Faroe Islands can expect no other arrangement than that between the Greenlanders and the Danish. According to this arrangement, both the Danish authorities and the Faroese would have a veto right. If the Faroese want ownership rights to minerals, they must sever all ties with Denmark.

Before the elections, however, the Faroese Social Democrats proposed a so-called third solution, according to which the Faroese would have total control over where and when drilling for oil and gas and mining of other valuable minerals would occur but, as a matter of principle, it would be understood that the mineral rights belong to the entire Danish community. Negotiations would then be held to discuss how the booty would be divided.

In principle, this proposal has been well received by Anker Jorgensen who, in the past, has stood for an uncompromising Danish position. As prime minister, he once replied that "We will not shoot craps for the Faroe Islands."

It would be wise of the government to accept the dice cup it is now being offered--or to look reality in the eye, so to speak. In any event, Denmark's economic problems can never be solved with the help of a North Atlantic jackpot.

Atli Dam must now see, as the Faroese themselves say, that the southeasterly wind continues to blow over the grassy islands of the North Atlantic. But the younger generation of what is now the largest party on the Faroe Islands is impatient. The young Social Democrats have stated clearly that they support secession. If a Danish government stubbornly insists on a dubious colonial right to Faroese minerals, then the long-term consequences are clear. A sense of community must be based on a mutual feeling of kinship. This feeling is still present among a majority of the three sides that comprise the Kingdom of Denmark. But if it is absolutely necessary to measure this sense of community in kroner and ore and if it is to be synonymous with the sovereignty of 5 million Danes over 45,000 Faroese and 50,000 Greenlanders, then the term "kinship" is an illusion and these arrogant Faroese, who are accustomed to taking risks, will take this situation to its logical conclusion.

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CSO: 3613/55

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

GREENS' POLITICAL FUTURE, TACTICS ASSESSED

Orderly Practices Needed

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 7 Dec 84 p 1

/Article by Dr Diether Buhl, political editor: "More a Movement, Or Really a Party?--On the Eve of the Hamburg National Convention, It's a Question of Power and Responsibility"/

/Text/ At the time of the first frost of this winter, the Greens too are feeling an icy draft, but what they are experiencing is not anything seasonal; it corresponds to the natural political cycles. The euphoria following a series of electoral successes is beginning to dissipate. Exuberant confidence in victory is increasingly making way for the sobering question as to how the votes are to be converted into policies. A reply requires from the climbers more than detailed platform work. A more urgent subject to be discussed is their basic attitude toward power and responsibility in our state. Because the cumbersome question cannot be avoided any longer, the Green movement this weekend expects a national convention in Hamburg which will be lively even by its standards.

The Greens have been putting off a decision for a long time. Total opposition or a share in shaping matters? Normally it would have been necessary to point out the direction at the start, but the Greens do not happen to be a normal phenomenon. Nor was it necessary for them to be in a hurry, for neither an internal majority nor their opponents outside emphatically demanded a statement of principles from them. In their own ranks the intoxication with the electoral victories helped push aside the debate about principles, and the competition had other worries. In lieu of urgent inquiries by the traditional parties, the Greens quite often merely encountered guilt feelings among the established parties, which had a bad conscience owing to their ecological sins or their helplessness in the economic recession. In lieu of a specifically-oriented confrontation, they encountered far and wide a kind of breathless surprise at how fertile the soil in the republic was for the rank Green weed.

End of Closed Season

But now the Greens' closed season appears to be nearing an end. And a good thing too. There is need for clarification--not only because of the calculability of the political process in this country but primarily because of the novices' credibility.

And the hunting signals sound loudest in the Green hunting area. "Realos" and "Fundis" are sounding the bugle for the chase. The question is: Who will prevail--the realpolitik people, who want to share in the administration through participatory tolerance or even a coalition, or the fundamentalists, who for a start demand total opposition and condemn any sort of inclusion in the "system" as a sacrilege. One can hardly imagine a more explosive conflict of principles. In any case it will accompany the Greens beyond their national convention. This is something both Green camps, and even more so the traditional parties, will make sure of.

Actually the Bonn government parties are the least of the Greens' worries. The CDU/CSU and the FDP have had virtually nothing to say to critical youth in the past few years. Whatever could not be accomplished by conjuring up the golden times of Adenauer and promising a change certainly will not be achieved by merely raising a finger of warning. Since the Flick affaire and other scandals burdening the coalition, the power of persuasion of the coalition has suffered even more. The government parties for the time being definitely cannot be persuasive as apostles of political morality exhorting the Greens, as guardians of democratic rules, to assume responsibility.

With Kid Gloves

And how about the Social Democrats? They have to make up for a number of things. For a long time they handled the Greens with kid gloves without coming up with anything of their own to oppose the Green environmental populism. In their loneliness after having to abandon the power in Bonn, they did not want to frighten a potential partner. Many people, such as Willy Brandt, believed in a "majority this side of the CDU/CSU" capable of governing. Moreover the SPD was too split internally to accept the Green challenge. Finally, the not at all secret admiration by quite a few Social Democrats for the world and environment reformers weighed more heavily than the fear of the climbing competitor.

In the meantime the Social Democrats have begun to rediscover reality. Politicians such as Holger Boerner realize that a Social Democratic minister-president must not let the Greens lead him by the nose. People like Oskar Lafontaine have enough strategic feel to realize that the inconvenient movement can be broken in only by being put in government harness. The party is also beginning to realize something which Klaus von Dohnanyi drummed into his Hamburg comrades last weekend--that it cannot compete with the Greens in blowing platform soapbubbles, in the competition of political dreams.

If all this was universally accepted by the Social Democrats, it would not only serve the salvation of the SPD but could also contribute to depriving the Greens of their magic. It is not a question of denigrating their indisputable achievements. It remains to their credit that they impressed the ecological dangers on the consciousness of FRG citizens and warned against the dangers of economic-growth fetishism. They have to be given credit for having won over part of youth for politics and for having been the yeast which enabled a number of notable ideas to prevail. It is to their credit if they get the Bundestag going and cut through bureaucracy in many municipalities. That is quite a lot, to be sure, but it does not suffice for being a party.

Whoever is favored as much by the voters as the Greens are cannot demand to be free of responsibility in the long run. A political formation which shares in the discussion in the Bundestag, in 6 of 11 Land parliaments and in many municipal representations sooner or later also must share in the action. Because so much political weight obligates one, the same standard as governs the traditional parties should be applied. While the Sturm und Drang of the Greens may invite tolerance, the major party commands are also valid for them:

First--The ability to develop a program which is consistent--at least basically. A group which wants to offer something to everyone and programmatically speaks with several tongues mocks the voters. It undermines the trust in the political intentions of the parties, which is the basis of a democracy. The reproach of deceit, whether it is perpetrated intentionally or unintentionally, is valued as far as the Greens are concerned. It is not based on the confusing and contrary program overtures of the feuding wings; it can be demonstrated by the general line leading through almost all Green concepts. The industrialized and export state of the Federal Republic is to be curtailed, but at the same time the welfare state of the Federal Republic is to be expanded. This basic idea not only suggests a squaring of the circle; it indicates intellectual dishonesty and a brazen mocking of the voters.

Second--A readiness to promote and accept leadership personalities. The need is obvious. Leadership figures represent a party. They personify its claim. With the principle of rotation they continue to practice, the Greens reject this rule, thus preventing continuity and the birth of authority. The exchange of deputies prevents politicians from acquiring expertise and relieves them of a lasting obligation to their electors.

Third--A courage for power. The striving of a party for government power in a democracy is not only legitimate; in the final analysis it documents its being serious. If one does not want to drive, one remains a passenger who merely finds fault, pillories and makes demands but does not himself take the wheel. This is exactly how the Greens behave. This can best be demonstrated in the case of the ecology. While promoting environmental politics by word and demonstration, they prevent government majorities with whose help they could accomplish things themselves--first in Hamburg and now in Hesse.

It is not particularly popular to read the Greens the riot act. Where so much romanticism and idealism flourish, where one is so much a stickler for principles and where so much weltenschmerz flickers, many a German heart is touched. Nevertheless, one must handle the Greens less carefully. For one thing, because particularly among young people they arouse unending hopes which may lead to disappointment with perhaps dangerous consequences. For another, in the long run, conditions of unpredictability such as they have now caused in Hesse and perhaps will also soon provoke elsewhere have never yet agreed with a democratic country.

The Greens are now 5 years old. They began as a movement. Will they manage to become a party?

To be a pool of protest and pioneers of modesty in material things--this is something that has occurred time and again in history. A longing for the simple life has existed since Socrates, if not earlier ("How much there is I can do without!"), and will also outlast the Greens. But they cannot credibly claim that they are serious until they accept the law of democracy: whoever sets objectives in politics must be prepared at one time or other to make the effort of traveling the road, paved the compromises, that leads to them.

Various Criticisms Voiced

Hamburg DIE ZELT in German 7 Dec 84 p 5

/Article by Dr Gunther Hofmann, Bonn editorial staff member, datelined Bonn in December: "'Stay the Way You Are': The Greens Are Trying To Figure Out Why They Encounter Hatred and Misunderstanding"/

/Text/ Mulling over what he had heard, psychoanalyst Horst Eberhard Richter wondered why he was so pleased that this discussion was taking place here. He was a guest of the Greens at a meeting of their Bundestag deputies which dealt with the fact that the deputies of the newest Bundestag party increasingly were being bombarded with reproaches of fascism. "Nazi methods! The same as happened then! Mini-Goebbels! Worse than the Nazis!" Those were things which were in fact being voiced in almost every debate.

Eberhard Richter's judgment is that precisely because the Greens are loaded or burdened less with the most recent German history, because they "do not need to justify themselves so much," such comparisons are more and more frequently directed against them in the Bundestag. And he predicts that this has not yet come to an end, because we are living in a period "in which what has been suppressed is re-emerging" and a "new constraint to suffer through it" is imminent.

Or, precisely because they talk seriously, self-critically and gropingly about the reasons why part of the "established" are having such difficulty with them, they continue to contribute to insecurity and surges of emotions. According to what Richter appeared to say, even the very way in which the Greens cope with it characterizes them as new and "different."

There is something weird about the fact that, to the extent that not only tactical party motives provide the impetus, it is this feeling that apparently is back of the anti-Green polemics. It is something the Greens sense correctly. And what is this something? That question is what the discussion was all about. Three Social Democratic deputies--Heinz Westphal, Ernst Waltemathe and Dietrich Sperling--and Liberal Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher participated as guests. CDU/CSU politicians couldn't make it.

There was and continues to be plenty of food for thought. It is not the first time historical parallels are catching up with parliamentarians and are overwhelming them. Weimar and the history of the Hitler years have often intruded into the Bundestag. But something about the climate has changed--of all things, at the very moment when Helmut Kohl can talk about being the first chancellor

of the postwar generation. What that is supposed to mean is that it is now possible to draw the line. Yet after such lines are drawn, apparently the controversy starts all over again with a terrible lack of self-consciousness.

The guests of the established parties of course defended the Greens against the charge of their being Nazis (or even communists!). Fascism certainly looks different, they said; the parallels were wrong and unjust, defaming the Greens and making light of National Socialism.

But the praise was coupled with paternal criticism. Ernst Waltemathe (born in 1935) thought that it had not yet been made clear what the Greens' opinion was about the rule of law. Their relationship toward parliamentary democracy was marked by elitist bourgeois arrogance. Their own value judgments were too easily moralistically exaggerated. Ethics and practice were often in conflict. While rotation was the opposite of the leadership principle, it too depersonalized political life. Even by the way they dressed the new members were sometimes ridiculing the Bundestag.

Some forms and external features, added Heinz Westphal (born in 1924) occasionally did in fact recall "it"--that is, the end of Weimar. He thought that when the Greens made the argument that they were pained more by the Nazi charge than by the comparison with communists, that very thing indicated a "break in generations." Looking back to the fall of the first republic, Westphal does not distinguish between extreme rightists and extreme leftists.

Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher (born in 1921) maternally combined praise and reprimand. Democracy, she said to her "dear young friends," had not yet been achieved, and that remained a mortgage. She said she was glad that the Greens had broken into the closed society of politics; perhaps for the first time democracy was really growing from below. On the other hand, she criticized the Greens, saying that it remained for them to make it clear as to whether they consented in principle to a representative parliamentary democracy. They were ridiculing and mocking a lot, saying "That is what the Nazis too did," and sometimes she felt hurt. There was talk about feeling hurt in the further course of the discussion, without the speakers hiding behind cliches. They used the word "I," and that is rare enough.

Impressive criticism, in other words. But the Greens are not squeamish; on the contrary, they listen. One of them complained that he could see an all too often exaggerated "cult of movements" in his own ranks. He does not like battle cries which sound like "Hurrah, we want to carry the movement into the parliaments!" There was no getting around the fact that as the youngest party one was utterly dependent on democratic culture.

Another Green said that it was also necessary to deal with some Green myths. For example, he did not like the equating of woman and nature. The relationship toward nature, society as a community of solidarity, the feature of a movement--all that had also been used by fascism.

Self-criticism was complemented by attempts at explanation. The established ones, said Antje Vollmer, felt an obligation to prove to be a democratic front against

those who were shaking them. After all, the Greens had broken the five-percent sound barrier. Cert Jannsen tried to explain the Nazi reproaches by the "immense fear of extremism in Germany."

The point was that no conscious political assimilation of National Socialism had taken place, said Jo Mueller. "Not in our case either," interjected someone. "But you are our children, so why should you assimilate it more?" said Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher impulsively.

On the other hand, Christa Nickels regards the difficult relationship between old and young in the Bundestag as a "political conflict of generations." When one has worked as many years as the reconstruction generation, says the Green Nickels (born in 1952), and "after having put one's shoulder to the wheel looks back on one's life's work and says, 'Okay,'...then, of all times, come young people who think that there ought to be something even better," and that is what people dislike about the Greens, for, she suspects, the older people think that "something better can also be something worse."

And are the Greens not arrogant? They--or some of them--do understand the reproach. But often the impression is also created because they "despair in the conditions." Then, sighs Will Hoss, he sometimes feels he would like to shake the established parties like an apple tree in order that they may understand at long last. "That is it exactly," interjects someone: "the fear of the apples of falling."

Participating in consumption played a key role in the postwar years. Gradually there came other wishes and dreams. But these dreams, explains Waltraude Schoppe, were occupied by the "alternative culture." Now particularly the CDU was attempting to attract again those who went in for such dreams. And the fascism charge served as a means for that.

So--to stick to his example--why was Horst Eberhard Richter (born in 1923) pleased? He admits quite openly: "We failed politically, we did not defend ourselves." He is pleased that the young ones are acting differently.

"What do you mean by 'failed'?" asks Heinz Westphal. Does Richter really mean "failed after 1945"? Some conclusions were drawn then, were they not? Surely an effort was made to come up with something and to rebuild. And Westphal gives the impression that from his point of view it did succeed fairly well. All the disgruntlement of an unblemished parental biography is being vented here. "Mr Westphal," says Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher trying to calm the person affected, "surely that was not meant personally."

Some people may feel that the Greens are too uppity and offensive. Some react to them like disappointed parents, others with furious projections. Let us hope that they stay the way they are, advises Horst Eberhard Richter on the other hand. There is a great deal of hope in that.

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SOCIAL REALITIES OUTPACE GUESTWORKER POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Permanent Turkish Community Evolving

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 21 Sep 84 p 10

/Article by Gerhard Spoerl: "Fear of the Foreigners"/

/Text/ By a mental exercise, a young Turkish woman recently provoked almost all Berliners. Serap Yavuz informed an irritated public that her Turkish compatriots were looking for ways of pushing their interests and needs. She said some people had been considering a "boycott of Germans"; upon implementation, 120,000 Turks would for 4 weeks stop patronizing German stores. Pressed by angered and alarmed journalists, Mrs Yavuz played things down, stating that at present the boycott was no more than an idea. But she added an ominous hint: "Something is going to happen"

The mental exercise created a great stir. The fear that the Turkish ghetto may rise up some day is part of the standard repertoire of both the level- and the hot-headed politicians. As yet, matters have not reached that point. But Serap Yavuz indicated that the Turks are about to learn politics from the Germans. Fringe groups have to scream, if they want to be heard.

The excitement about the boycott idea has died away. Politicians specializing in issues concerning aliens now have noted a new phenomenon: Among the many Turks, there has of late formed a small elite that feels it has a mission to protect the Turkish people's interests. Serap Yavuz is part of this group. She has been living in the Federal Republic for 17 years; she received all the blessings of that integration that according to many Germans should be imposed on the Turks. She speaks German fluently, knows the rules of the dominant culture and has accommodated herself to the prevailing conditions. She heads the personnel department of a Berlin meat wholesale business. In the SPD, she is in charge of matters pertaining to aliens.

In the jargon of immigration politics, Mrs Yavuz is considered a member of the "second Turkish generation." She grew up in Istanbul, but came of age in Berlin. Typically, this second generation is adrift between two countries and cultures. Their thinking is German, and their emotions, Turkish. There is no telling to what extent this is integration--equality-based integration into the new world--and how much of it is assimilation--smooth accommodation to the

prevailing conditions.

The second generation wants recognition and also expresses this desire. In Berlin, a "Turkish community" has of late been attracting attention. This group comprises the 13 moderate parties of Turkey--ranging from Ecevit's Social Democrats to the moderately religious; fundamentalists are not represented. The organization is headed by Zafir Ilgar--35 years old, director of the training center, member of the SPD. The community's objective: To help the Turks in Berlin to acquire self-assurance and influence. For according to the group, the Turks are an economic factor and should not be underrated as consumers of German goods and bank services.

These are the Turks' first attempts to define their position. They may fail or remain ineffectual. They should not be overrated. But the Turks' petite bourgeoisie is pursuing its objective resolutely and devotedly. There is a German-Turkish circle that includes Berlin trade unionists, representatives of both churches, Heinz Galinski of the Jewish Community and even an American army officer. The intent is to build bridges and the group is seeking support among the opinion leaders--a minority cautiously tries to gain access to the society representing the majority. In this respect, too, Berlin as the largest Turkish city outside of Turkey could be in the vanguard.

The change of consciousness is accompanied by a process of social differentiation. A good example in this regard is Cologne's Weidengasse, a rather shabby district near the inner city marked by dilapidated buildings dating back to the late 19th century. Here the Turks have established a colony of sorts. The Cologne Turks--a colorful mix of rich and poor, of egotism and profit seeking. At 10 o'clock in the morning, unemployed Turks and Germans are sitting in silent fellowship in a dreary, half-dark Turkish tavern, watching Turkish videos. Similarly, the Anatolian grocer next door can count on his German regulars. In the coffee house across the street, the atmosphere is totally oriental. The patrons are first-generation guestworkers who do not care about integration. When they get off work at a Ford or Kloeckner-Humboldt-Deutz plant, they come here to spend the afternoon drinking tea, playing backgammon or cards and listening to Turkish music. Nowhere but here is their home, their life.

The owner of a rather distinguished Turkish restaurant in the center of the Weidengasse district has made it. His patronage includes the Turkish consul general, and even Germans frequent the place--the district's depressing atmosphere notwithstanding. To be recognized and, what is more, to be independent--this is what makes the drudgery and self-denial worthwhile. The rich Turks have got used to judging their poor compatriots by German standards. Is it not true that they are untidy and shabbily dressed, that they tend to live in dirty streets and that their appearance immediately shows them to be Anatolians? Is it not true that they are troublesome, because they are incapable of accommodating themselves to German standards?

Sociologists take seriously such attitudinal shifts and differentiation processes. The colony is beginning to change. Understandably, the middle class is dissociating itself. The restaurant owner will avail himself of the next

opportunity to move to a better, that is to say a German district. Politically as well as economically, the second generation is influenced by the Germans' drive for success and prestige. Its success may inspire others to make an effort. This process began sometime ago and--just as there is no predicting success or failure--there is no telling when it will come to an end. All one can say is that it is taking place.

The discussion in the Federal Republic has remained unaffected by this development, even though the change is reflected in plain, easily accessible figures. To be sure, these figures are indicative of a trend that qualifies widespread prejudices. The */extremely prolific Turks/* *[this and the following passages in slantlines printed in italics]*: They no longer have as many children as is suggested by German calculations; this is at least an approximation to the customs of the German industrial society. */Indifference towards education/*: In the last few years, 60 percent of the Turkish children finished junior high school (previously, only 40 percent); according to the Federal Institute for Vocational Training, even those who enter the school system at a later stage, i.e. those who come here at the age of 10, 12 or 14, are contrary to expectations capable of learning quickly and industriously. */Turkish men marry only Turkish women/*: Cross-cultural marriages are no longer the exception and in contrast to previous practice, more and more Turkish women now marry German men. According to the Federal Office for Statistics, mixed marriages constitute over 50 percent of all new marriages.

These figures might be considered exceptions to the rule. But they can also be regarded as a symptom. While we are still arguing about whether or not the Federal Republic should be an immigration country, others are making the decision for us. The Federal Republic--a non-immigration country admitting immigrants.

The way immigration policy is being discussed in Bonn, Berlin and elsewhere gives the impression that since 1980 nothing has changed. During this period, the mode of perceiving the foreigners has grown increasingly rigid: The aliens, and the Turks in particular, are seen as a potential threat to the German soul and the social structure. As a result of the economic crisis, fear of foreign infiltration and competition had taken hold of the Germans. On the surface, this was a reaction to the "inundation" of the country by all kinds of aliens--normal foreigners (at that time, 4.7 million) and people seeking asylum (in 1980 alone, 100,000) whose motives frequently were dubious.

The politicians were well advised to take the xenophobia into account. Opinion pollsters discovered that a good 50 percent of all Germans were hostile to foreigners. Right-wing extremists saw their chance: In 1987, two Vietnamese were assassinated. Racist slogans appeared; citizens' initiatives called for a Germany belonging to Germans. Even the academic guild--publishing the Heidelberg Manifesto--voiced misgivings reminiscent of Blood-and-Soil */Nazi ideology/* ideas. In communal election campaigns, there appeared tickets inspired by xenophobia.

At present, the strident, racist overtones have faded. There is no doubt, however, that immigration policy will play an important role in the coming

communal and state elections. In Berlin, there has recently been established the "Soziale Volkspartei Deutschlands" [Social People's Party of Germany], a right-wing offshoot of the SPD which is stirring up public opinion against all those politicians who show a lack of "responsibility and respect for the German people." Conversely, in Wiesbaden the SPD is unhappy about having had to uncover--at an inopportune time--its liberal strain. Hesse did away with the customary restrictions and the CDU gratefully seized the opportunity. It frequently is difficult to distinguish between questionable populism and plausible argumentation. With aliens constituting 23 percent of its population, Frankfurt holds the German record. Offenbach (21 percent) is a close second. Are even more foreigners going to be admitted? Scaremongering as policy, the aliens as a purely quantitative problem: This is what all the solutions proposed by the parties in the last few years have been based on.

In regard to immigration policy, none of the parties can boast about any advances. Neither the CDU nor Friedrich Zimmermann or Heinrich Lummer has a monopoly of illiberal ideas. The selection of aliens recommended today was conceived by social-liberal minds. It was the then interior minister Baum who pondered the question whether Turkish children over the age of 6 should be allowed to come here. In the view of the government of that time, Germany was collapsing under a flood of aliens.

Now as before, there is big talk and little action. Whenever Interior Minister Zimmermann is criticized for being inactive, he replies to the effect that he has produced the desired effect just the same. The effect: After years of continuous increase, there are presently fewer foreigners in the country (on 31 March 1984, precisely 4,466,931) than 2 years ago. The government's bakshish policy certainly contributed to this decrease. Aliens willing to go home were given a bonus; others cashed in their pensions. The return home in old age is a well-known phenomenon. Only 0.2 percent of the 1.5 million Turks living here are over 65. Moreover, there has been a change in regard to supply and demand. To be sure, even today the Federal Republic is the Promised Land to all Turks; nearly 90 percent of all worker-emigres have settled down here. But the hard facts--xenophobia, unemployment--have been getting about.

Friedrich Zimmermann has made it clear that he will suit the action to the word. In the last 2 years, however, he has gotten into another dilemma: He has given rise to hopes that he is unable to fulfill. If only he had learned from the experience. So far, however, he has refused to admit to himself that he is unable to realize his objective. He thus has joined the ranks of those politicians of the 1970's who did a lot of talking, improvising and reacting and who in so doing always achieved the opposite of what they had had in mind.

The real turning point in regard to immigration policy was the year 1973. The chancellor's address of 18 January 1973 contained the following statement: "To keep on good terms with these minorities (i.e. the aliens) will be for all citizens a daily test of their tolerance, a chance to develop their democratic consciousness." In the same year, on account of the oil crisis and the economic recession, the government ordered a hiring freeze for guest-workers. Even at that time, the motto was: Integration for those who are

here; their number has to be limited. Germany should and would be no immigration country. Unexpectedly, however, this is what the Federal Republic turned out to be.

--The typical guest-worker of the 1960's had come alone, without his family, so as to earn and save more and then at home to turn his savings to good account. After 1973, he settled down. In the interest of the desired integration, he was allowed to bring his family into the country. The consequences: In spite of the hiring freeze, more and more aliens came in. In 1973, there were 3.99 million; in 1979, they numbered 4.1 million and in 1982, 4.66 million.

--The social structure underwent changes: In 1961, 80 percent of all guest-workers held down a job. Women and children were an insignificant minority. In 1973, the working aliens still constituted 60 percent, whereas today a mere 40 percent are gainfully employed. The result: Domestic institutions such as schools and kindergartens registered extraordinary enrollment

--The alien problem as a Turkish problem. In the 1960's, the Italians were the largest national group among the guest-workers. In the 1970's, they were outstripped by the Turks. Today the Turks (5.1 million) account for 34 percent of all aliens.

Friedrich Zimmermann distinguished more clearly than others between good and bad aliens. Firstly: The old guest-worker solution was the best one. If economic conditions are favorable, many may come; if not, many must leave again. Secondly: The Turks are the only problem. They are and remain strangers causing offence. They are neither able nor willing to adjust. Thirdly: The Germans' patience is limited. They want to be by themselves. It is a question of our security and order. For legal reasons, however, the German interests can be furthered only up to a point. Those guest-workers who came before 1973 cannot be forced to go home. Their children are germanized, as it were, because they have the technical qualifications for integration: Knowledge of German, education, manners and life style.

There are other factors, namely foreign policy-related considerations, that restrict the choices available to the politicians and the government. The Germans cannot solve the Turkish problem without the--at least tacit--agreement of the Turkish Government. In late 1986, the "EC Association Agreement" with Turkey will come into force. The hiring freeze would then be pointless, since the agreement guarantees all Turks free access to all countries of the community.

The scope of action of German domestic policy is limited. It is possible to prevent young Turks who are legally entitled to immigrate from actually doing so. The bureaucracy calls this a lowering of the immigration age from presently 16 to 6 years. And it is possible to prevent young Turkish men and women living here from marrying in Istanbul, Izmir or Anatolia, that is one can restrict the subsequent immigration of spouses.

These proposals are based on weighty arguments. The earlier children come into a strange world, the better are their chances of adjustment. The statistics show, however, that the discussion is no longer up to date: 90.5 percent of all Turkish children born in the Federal Republic remain with their parents. Of the 15-year-olds, 65 percent are in the country. A number of Turkish families have already made their final choice. Another example: At present, 600,000 German Turks are under the age of 16. If every third of them marries in Turkey, at most 12,500 new immigrants would be coming here in any given year.

All the drafts, papers and announcements of the federal and state governments begin with the statement: Integration is necessary. In most cases, there is a hint of regret about the fact that repatriation is impossible. Reduction is a constant concern; the form and meaning of integration are irrelevant. This kind of policy suffers from a juridical complex and this is the cause of its failure. Viewed realistically, integration is a protracted process that gives rise to ever new contradictions. Old ties disintegrate, but are not immediately replaced by new ones; families experience conflicts and break up. Life processes of this kind cannot be settled by decree, let alone here and now and for good.

So far, the Turks have always been urged to make up their mind. They are about to do that. The separation of German Turks who want to stay in the country--at least for an extended period--from Turkish Turks who want to be nothing but guest-workers is under way. In this respect, the development meets German expectations. This goes also for the total number of aliens, which seems to be leveling off somewhere between 4 and 5 million. It should be noted, however, that in the Federal Republic an ethnic minority has formed that claims its place in German society: As wage-earners, as taxpayers, as an economic factor, as neighbors. Originally, this development was undesirable. But it is practically irresistible. It can only be obstructed.

The Federal Government will soon be drafting a new law on aliens and it will have to face the facts. If it is serious about integration, it will be well-advised to let go of its obsessive concern with getting rid of as many aliens, i.e. Turks, as possible. To be capable of integration presupposes courage and the chance to plan one's life. Legal and social conditions conducive to this can be created. The Berlin Turks want to prove to the Germans that the attempt is worthwhile, and in this context even symbolic acts are important. During a discussion on television, Zafir Elgar and Heinrich Lummer promised each other to walk through the city and jointly wipe off "Turks go home" graffiti.

Naturalization Viewed Sceptically

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 21 Sep 84 p 10

[Article by Nina Grunenberg: "Can Turks Become Germans?"]

[Text] Whenever the Federal Government's policy on aliens is discussed, there arises the question of naturalization. The guest-workers, they say (meaning almost exclusively the Turks, however), should make up their mind.

Either they go back to their homeland or they become German citizens.

The proposal has its points. It seems like a clean solution, adequate to the magnitude of the problem--hard, but just. Moreover, it has the advantage of appealing to both the right and the left. The former wants to use citizenship as a threat, in order to make the eternally hesitant Turks commit themselves. Indecision regarding the return home and consideration of such a return even after decades of residence in the Federal Republic--this Turkish trait seems to awaken a German penchant for simple solutions.

Liberals and leftists, on the other hand, who feel guilty about the "Turkish problem," hope to be able--by means of a less complicated naturalization process--to free the guest-workers from their "political helots' existence" and to help them attain equal status. In for a penny, in for a pound--this is their motto. But is naturalization really the right way to escape the ambiguities of German immigration policy? And can Turks become German?

So far, not many Turks have tried this of their own accord. In his time, Heinz Kuehn, the first federal official in charge of matters pertaining to aliens, was struck by this abstention. "Experience has shown," he wrote in a 1979 report, "that of the over 1 million aliens who have been living here for 10 years and longer, relatively few availed themselves of the naturalization opportunity offered. In 1978, for example, only 312 (i.e. not even 0.3 percent) of the 130,000 Turkish citizens meeting the residence requirements acquired German citizenship." So far, this trend has not materially changed.

"What's in it for me?" a Turk replied to the question why he has not applied for German citizenship after 20 years of residence in the Federal Republic. "For those who know me, I don't need it. To those who don't know me, my face will always remain that of a stranger" Many of his compatriots who have given thought to these matters take a similar view. It is commonly said that for the Turks in the Federal Republic the "climate" is "too bad." A Turkish jurist, who has been living in Hamburg for many years and who has no intention of acquiring German citizenship, stated: "After all, Germany is no immigration country. In America, the situation is quite different. Over there, a foreigner feels at home much sooner. If on account of the rising unemployment the political problems are compounded by social tensions, there is no point in staying in Germany."

The German Turks' realism is unmatched, but it would be wrong to assume that their reserve in regard to naturalization is based exclusively on practical considerations. To get the whole picture, one should keep in mind that nothing is more terrifying to a Turk than the threat to "germanize" him and thus to deprive him of his identity. Even if he does not have much and even though his country is too poor to sustain him--he still has his pride. On this pride, Ataturk even founded the modern Turkish state. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed like a house of cards, when the Turks lost their wars and their empire was wrested from them bit by bit, Ataturk made them rally round the flag by means of the battle cry: "Turk, be proud of your fatherland!" Even today--today again--this motto is displayed on banners above Anatolian

village streets. The 6-year-olds recite it at school. The Turkish people's national pride is carefully cultivated.

"Fortunate is the man who can call himself a Turk"--another Ataturk statement that is part of the collection of patriotic slogans and that is displayed even in domestic aircraft and long-distance buses. The people are firmly convinced that someone born a Turk will die a Turk.

It was only among the guest-workers that this situation gradually brought on questions, problems and, finally, conflicts. The difficulties are most obvious in connection with the education of the children. Many Turkish parents deliberately sent--and still send--their children to the extended family in Turkey, as soon as they reach school age: To assure their remaining Turks, they are to live in Turkey at least for the 5-year Turkish school term. Subsequently, the parents bring them back into the Federal Republic.

Meanwhile, the enrollment figures for Turkish first-graders going to school in the Federal Republic have been going up. Later on, however, these growing children are the reason, why many Turks pack their bags and leave the Federal Republic. "They are to stay with me and my culture," said a Turk who this year returned to Istanbul along with his two daughters (11 and 13 years old). Since his children are girls, he felt obligated to exercise special care. He feared the "loose morals" in the Federal Republic. The lot of the young girls--much lamented by German social workers and teachers--is indicative of the strictness--even violence--Turks are capable of for the sake of remaining loyal to their culture. For a Turk, the girls are the symbol of the family's honor. For their protection, almost anything goes.

As a rule, Turks marry Turks--even if they grew up in the Federal Republic. Few Turkish men marry German women; even fewer Turkish women marry German men. Choosing one's spouse is part of the identity problem. The fear that their children may fall prey to dangerous ideas makes Turkish parents send them to Turkey for marriage. If their influence is sufficiently strong, they even select the spouse for their child. Only when the second generation acquires greater independence than is granted by Turkish society will it make different decisions.

The Turks' identity problems are caused not only by their situation in the Federal Republic. Their homeland is a contributing factor. At home, the guest-workers are admired and envied for their "wealth" and skills. But they are also abused, because they gave up the good old traditions and because they have been "spoiled" by the alien civilization. The moral condemnation is fanned by the new Islamic zeal. Consequently, the guest-workers constant concern is to prove to their critics that they have remained loyal Turks.

Even their own government, however, stands in the way of such proof of loyalty. Until approximately 3 years ago, Turks moving to the Federal Republic ceased to exist for the Turkish Government. The guest-workers were considered emigrés. They were welcome only in their capacity as suppliers of foreign currency. The deutschmark transfer from the Federal Republic is one of the mainstays of the Turkish budget. The Turkish Government's indifferent, even

harsh attitude towards the Turks abroad is understandable: Waves of emigration such as the Europeans experienced as early as the 19th century were something new to Turkey. The country is inexperienced in this regard.

Only in the recent past has Ankara begun to regard the guest-workers not only as an economic factor, but also as a political chance--as the foot, by means of which the door to Europe can be kept open. Behind this, there is the idea of a Turkish lobby in the heart of Europe--a lobby that could be as effective, generous and influential as the Greek, Polish or Jewish lobbies in Washington.

Against this background, German citizenship no longer appears to be so simple and clean a solution as it seemed at first glance. The threat of compulsory naturalization has deeply offended Turkey. It was stated that integration of the Turkish guest-workers in the Federal Republic will be approved only, if their national, cultural and religious identity is protected. Exactly what this means no one knows. One thing is certain, however: It does not mean that Turks can become Germans.

Naturalization is not a political solution; it is a political slogan, the insidiousness of which is obvious to many first-generation Turks. They want to remain Turks. For their children, who grew up in both cultures, the answer may be different. Heavy-handed solutions, however, are of no use to them, either. Many of them do not know yet what they are--Germans or Turks--or to what country their loyalty ties them--to Turkey or to Germany. Consequently, the jurists will have to consider interim-solutions: The number of Turkish guest-workers who consider dual citizenship for their children is rising, but the obstacles are high (in Turkey), if not nearly insurmountable (in the Federal Republic). But even this approach would not make a Turk a half-German. This process--now that it has begun--will go on for generations. In the meantime, it is advisable to speak of a Turkish minority in the Federal Republic.

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CSO: 3620/15

POLITICAL

FINLAND

COUNTRY'S LEADING PAPER ON SOVIET MISSILE INTRUSION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Jan 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Systems Tested by Intruder"]

[Text] Alluding to the Geneva foreign ministers conference in his New Year's address, President Mauno Koivisto said: "Now, on the eve of these negotiations, is an appropriate time to take up the subject of our own concern for these weapons systems, which create special problems for us."

We received a sample of the problems he was referring to even many days before; a violation of Finland's air space was observed on Friday afternoon. The investigations had been set in motion and even in part completed, but knowledge of them did not reach the public, getting ready for the new year, to disturb its peace of mind.

Once again, important information involving Finland was first made public in the foreign news media. Officials' after-the-fact statement that they were ready to report the matter here too in all the detail that has come to light does not make the situation any better. The incident is another one in a long, doleful series of wrong appraisals.

Citizens are suspiciously asking whether the incident would have been reported at all if the Norwegians had not published it. After an opportune moment that lasted many days, we would have expected behavior more prone to arouse confidence from our officials in connection with this.

The ultimate reasons for the cruise missile's straying will probably remain unknown. The off-course missile at any rate effectively tested the level and readiness of both Norway and Finland's current air surveillance systems. Specifically, this affair has made officials close-mouthed.

In its report the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee assumed that with the development of anticruise-missile systems we would supplement our surveillance and defense systems as necessary and as our means permit. This sort of incident proves that this was carefully considered talk.

It is more obvious than before that the Northern European security situation is part of the worldwide and European situations. The cruise missile that strayed

into Finland's air space further demonstrates that the power lines of international politics come very close to touching our country. Talk of our remote location is futile with respect to this.

Troublesome incidents have an unpleasant tendency to crop up just before exacting negotiations. So much work has, however, been done for the Geneva conference that a violation of the air space of Northern European nations is incapable of jeopardizing it. The initial international comments also foretold the fact.

Suitable technological armament has advanced with great strides despite arms limitation talks. Cruise missiles are its latest harvest. Finding a place for them in strategic arms limitation agreements will be a particularly difficult challenge.

Naturally, President Mauno Koivisto's unofficial trip to Sweden was decided on a long time ago. The timing offers the president an opportunity to exchange views, while the matter is still of current interest, with Swedish foreign policy leaders on cruise missiles and a nuclear-free zone, among other things.

11,466

CSC: 4617/48

POLITICAL

FINLAND

SORSA ON SUPERPOWER RELATIONS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Dec 84 p 11

[Text] Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa (Social Democrat) is of the opinion that, as far as the superpowers are concerned, the new year will begin in a more hopeful atmosphere than that of the year that is now coming to an end. In the customary New Year's address delivered to the STT [Finnish News Bureau], the prime minister alluded to the conference of superpower foreign ministers to be held in January. The initiation of the process is, according to him, a cautious one, "but if it succeeds, it may open more secure prospects for the future."

In his address Sorsa remarked that in 1984 the arms race accelerated to an unprecedented extent. "Negotiations on arms control between the superpowers were not entered into, with the political, ideological and military race instead dominating relations between them."

According to the prime minister, the tense relations between the superpowers have been especially reflected in Europe and have led to a certain helplessness. Sorsa noted that during the second half of the year, however, signs of a reconsideration of the situation by the superpowers appeared, and he pointed to the U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers conference at which they may discuss the relaunching of arms control talks.

According to the prime minister, we have been able to foster Finnish prosperity without any serious foreign or domestic disturbances. It is estimated that Finland's economic development will continue to be relatively favorable for a while in 1985, although a sharp leveling off of the growth rate is, according to Sorsa, predicted for the second half of the year.

According to the prime minister, the year that is about to begin will bring "new pressures" on our economic policy. The old problems will, however, continue to exist and, in Sorsa's opinion, despite this year's results, there is a need for doing even better in combatting inflation. Sorsa said that the peaceful reform effort will also continue next year in Finland. Sorsa described the reform of the Constitution which is to be discussed in Parliament as being in principle important.

The prime minister further listed the enactment of laws to improve the means of caring for small children and the formulation of a flexible means of reducing retirement age and the number of working hours by the end of 1986 as issues of current importance.

Prime Minister Sorsa also said that "demands for the improvement of young people's housing conditions, the extension of home loan terms and raising the child-subsidy age limit will probably increase in the year that is about to begin."

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CSO: 3617/48

POLITICAL

FINLAND

CHRISTIAN PARTY SEEKS STRONGER PROFILE, PROGRAM

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 27 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by Tuula Ponnii]

[Text] Chairman Asko Almgren promises that color will be introduced into the faded Christian League party image. "Three bills in the handling of which Christian Leaguers will be visible are to be presented in Parliament: the last-name bill, the alcohol bill and the alcoholics care bill. All of these are matters of principle in connection with which Christian Leaguers present a sharp profile," Almgren asserted.

The Christian League's sharper profile to a large extent bears the cachet of a brakeman, the presence of which chairman Almgren does not even dispute. The party has acquired this cachet because it has been visible and distinctive only in opposing something or other. Abortion and mild beer or the last-name bill, even during the earlier debate on it.

Almgren lays part of the blame -- as is the custom of the times -- on the news media. They do not, in Almgren's opinion, take sufficient note of a small party's doings in "ordinary" situations. And since the basic issues the Christian League has felt to be its own have recently been overly analyzed, the party profile has managed to slide to a very low point.

New Faces Sought

Almgren has been the chairman of the Christian League for over 2 years. Described as being more worldly and statesmanlike than former chairman Raimo Westerholm, Almgren has been criticized for these qualities too and once some people even tried to bring him down by making an effort to get Westerholm back into the party leadership.

Made in the summer of 1983, the attempt failed at the start and with that Almgren felt that he had received the party's blessing for his policy.

Almgren is at present probably very firmly ensconced in his chairman's post. Although he does have critics because of the party's poor showing in the municipal elections. The last time too, when Almgren replaced his predecessor, it was after a poor showing in the municipal elections.

According to Almgren, talk of replacing leaders gets started easily among the Christian League rank and file because members are particularly unfamiliar with politics. Almgren said that, because of the limited options, replacing the chairman is the first thing that comes to mind when they are convinced that something ought to be done.

Former party Member of Parliament Sauli Nautala of Turku, among others, has been longing for new faces in the Christian League leadership. The primary reason that has been offered for this is the fact that Almgren is not felt to present an appealing figure on television among his own people either and that he is not a type that appeals to the public. They would like to have a more charismatic lay preacher type as a face on television, not one like Almgren's, which is a bit like that of a man on a pedestal.

Only a suitable candidate has not been found in the ranks of the Christian League. Some would be ready to bring back former chairman Westerholm. Others say that Westerholm is getting ready to return; after all, the man, who at one time remained and was left on the sidelines for reasons of ill health, has returned to the Helsinki Municipal Council and has become the district chairman. Many believe that Westerholm is also the only one, feeling at home in the party leadership, who could defeat Almgren. Since it is apparently not their custom in the party to oust anyone. They can, of course, properly inform people about the justification for his departure.

"Rank and File Fears Discussion"

Christian League activists accuse the party of being an ideologically lazy debater. They say that there has been no room for discussion in the party, nor have they wanted to find debaters either. Discussion and any kind of criticism is regarded as divisive and taking place in the wrong spirit. Those who long for discussion say that the party's basic premises, its moral indignation have thus remained unchanged, even though there may have been opportunities for change.

Almgren admits that there has been unnecessarily little discussion in the party. According to Almgren, however, this is the fault of the rank and file, not the party leadership.

"The Christian League rank and file is incapable of taking a stand on a political debate. They adopt points of departure directed at individuals, which we politicians are certainly familiar with. But if you respond to the rank and file in kind, they are shocked," Almgren said.

Goals Set High

"Our goal in the next parliamentary elections is the support of 5 percent [of the electorate]," Almgren said. Since, according to Almgren, its support having sunk to 3 percent in the municipal elections and having lost a fifth, or 50, of its municipal council seats, the Christian League can only move upwards from here on in.

In fact, even retaining their present three seats in Parliament may be a difficult thing for the Christian Leaguers to do. If the party does not enter into favorable election coalitions, every single one of its seats in Parliament will be in danger. Election coalition partners are already being reviewed, from among all the center parties.

In the opinion of all Christian Leaguers, there is no reason to even dream of getting the 10 seats in Parliament they held in past years. Almgren nevertheless sets his goals high: "Our brother party in Norway has a support base of from 8 to 10 percent. In the longer run we have a chance of obtaining the same figure," Almgren said.

Although we might not believe it, there is at least not yet reason to suppose that the Christian League will disappear completely. Almgren said that the party has a steadfast bloc of supporters, nearly 100,000 loyal followers. People who would not vote at all if there were no Christian League. That is, as long as the Christian Leaguers can keep those who used to be dormant in motion, a certain basic support bloc will be assured them.

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PAPERS CHRONICLE DETAILS OF CP DISPUTE OVER SPECIAL CONGRESS

Majority Tightens District Control

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Oct 84 p 13

[Text] Two Stalinist districts required to yield.

The Finnish Communist Party (SKP) moderate leadership is gradually tightening its grip on the SKP's Stalinist Turku and Uusimaa districts, which are advocating a hard line.

According to Communist sources, the party leadership plans to give the two district organizations 2 weeks time to withdraw their action.

The Uusimaa district, led by Markus Kainulainen, and the Turku district, led by Toivo Forss, have sent their party cells directives in which the cells are encouraged not to submit to Central Committee directives. According to the sources, an explanation of the directives is being demanded of the districts. The matter will be on the agenda at the Central Committee meeting to be held on Saturday.

Turku and Uusimaa got into the moderate-led SKP's line of fire as early as last June when the party decided to start to direct the work of the party conducted in those districts over the heads of the district organizations.

Getting the two Stalinist districts to submit to the will of the moderate leadership may be regarded as a minor miracle. The next step in the moderate leaders' strategy will probably be for them to set up new district organizations in the districts' territories, organizations that will safely tip the balance of power in favor of the moderate majority at the coming special congress.

Not Yet Organized

The moderate party cells operating in the Turku and Uusimaa districts have not yet held organizing meetings at which they would set up new district organizations. The new district organizations can be approved as members at the December Central Committee meeting.

At the 1-day Central Committee meeting they plan to adopt a favorable position on the Stalinist districts' demand for the organization of a special congress, but specific decisions, for example, whether the new congress will be held with the former or the new representatives, will not be made before December.

In September SKP chairman Arvo Aalto announced that decisions on which the future of the party would largely depend would be reached at the October Central Committee meeting. The final decisions appear to have been postponed until November.

It is estimated that the special congress will be scheduled for sometime during the early months of next year. The outside limit will probably be March.

The Central Committee has endorsed the dismissal of the SKP's Kainuu district secretary, Reino Leinonen. So-called hard-line top man Arvo Kemppainen has for a long time now been chasing after the district secretary seat held by Leinonen, who is one of Kajanoja's men. The SKP's Keski-Suomi district secretary will also be replaced.

The Central Committee intends to reply to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) letter. The CPSU's letter recently sharply criticized the current SKP leadership's line.

According to Aalto, speaking on Friday, the preparations for the special congress will be handled in such a way that "the unanimous political decisions of last May's congress will be endorsed in all respects at this congress."

According to Aalto, the SKP has only one alternative to advance: the achievement of active unity.

"This is not possible in a context in which we would continue to fight over the SKP in a state of formal unity. Life is a many-sided process and we will not jump from the present situation into some sort of ideal and harmonious kind of unity, rather the precondition for existence within the same party is putting an end to separate activities. Without this there will be no sense to our bustling about," Aalto said.

Stalinists Propose Negotiations

The eight Stalinist district organizations have presented the Central Committee with a memorandum in which they propose negotiations over the preparations for the unifying special congress. The districts propose that, among other things, former SKP chairman Jouko Kajanoja and "representatives of the party's other important factions" participate in the negotiations. According to the memorandum, the choice of a new party leadership is to be made in such a way that it expresses the will of the party members, is capable of carrying out the above-mentioned tasks and of uniting the party.

Kajanoja: Leadership Splitting Party

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 29 Oct 84 p 32

[Text] Former SKP chairman Jouko Kajanoja regards the SKP Central Committee decisions on Saturday as a step toward a splitting of the party. In Kajanoja's opinion, party members should take the reins in their hands now and block the party leadership's organizational maneuvering if they want to prevent a party split.

The decisions of the SKP Central Committee, which met on Saturday, mean the encouragement of moderates working in Stalinist district areas to set up new party cells. Before, the party leadership has only interfered in the activities of the Turku and Uusimaa districts, which adhere to the rigid Stalinist line.

One of the key SKP Stalinist figures, former vice chairman Taisto Sinisalo, feels that the Central Committee decisions are surprising.

"The basic policy line is in a surprisingly tough situation in which we would have expected quite different kinds of measures. This is a step toward the establishment of parallel district organizations."

According to Kajanoja, the Central Committee decisions make the factional split deeper than it was before. He was also surprised at the dismissal of the moderate district secretary of Kainuu, who advocates unity.

"This development will lead to a splitting of the party into at least two parts."

Stalinists Stand Firm on Their Demands

According to Sinisalo, the Stalinists are not considering any particular organizational measures before a possible special congress.

"The focus is on establishing political objectives, the most important of which is, of course, a change in the party leadership."

Kajanoja, however, fears that the party leadership may make a fair membership vote impossible through its organizational maneuvering.

New Stage in Dispute Passed

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 30 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Zero Hour for Communist Dispute Near"]

[Text] The many resolutions made over the years with reference to the unification of the SKP have proven themselves to be fruitless. The factional split has continued to be as bad or worse than it was. The passage in the rules "obliging all members equally to engage in a consciously disciplined, united fighting organization" has long since become a dead letter issue.

The congress last spring, however, seems to have constituted a turning point. It obliged "the Central Committee to take the necessary steps to see to it that the direction of party operations takes place in all the district organizations in accordance with the decisions of the Central Committee." The measures adopted in the party, above all in terms of the moderate line, which are clearly tougher than before, forebode a change.

The special congress demanded by the Stalinists will, of course, be convoked, but only on the moderates' terms. They include an intensification of activities in the Stalinist-controlled districts and preparations for the moderates to set up their own cells in them. This in turn will probably mean a straight flush for the moderates at the congress: only loyal supporters.

The Central Committee decisions exactly adhere to the rigid line the new party leadership proclaimed immediately after being elected. In the party they no longer recognize factions and the party has no other policy than the one pursued by the Central Committee and the party leadership, as first secretary Aarno Aitamurto announced.

As for chairman Arvo Aalto, he rejected a return to formal party unity, which would mean two parties under the same roof. He also briefly considered the possibility offered by the rules of expelling quarrelsome old members. "We will resort to this only as an extreme last measure if nothing else helps to restore order."

The party leadership also asserted that the SKP leadership is ready to continue its relations with the CPSU as it is with the other brother parties in accordance with the principles commonly endorsed by the international communist movement. It is thus striving to exonerate itself of the charges that have been leveled against it and to express its loyalty, knowing that the CPSU supports unity and rejects divisive decisions.

There were just no other alternatives to the moderates' course of action. Otherwise, they would have had to renounce the policy they have adopted. Now they at least have rules on their side and the decisions of the congress and the Central Committee, which leave the Stalinists very little room to maneuver in.

Chairman Aalto sets a more uncompromising line: "We must step up the attack on the government's economic policy." If this happens, the party will be toughening up its line in the style of the Stalinists, which will in time also create difficulties for the overall political picture.

A toughening line in the party will dig the soil out from under the Stalinists' feet, but this will also mean a political convergence with the Stalinists and new points of contact in the party dispute, on which it will soon be time for an either-or decision.

Left Threatens to Absent Congress

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 30 Oct 84 p 32

[Text] The decisions of SKP Central Committee made on Saturday are indicative of an accelerating process of dissolution of the party. In a letter to the

Central Committee, the SKP's Stalinist-controlled Tampere district has deliberately announced that it will absent itself from the special congress to be held in March if the party leadership sets up the new, moderate-controlled, parallel district organizations it is planning and permits them to participate in the congress.

At its Saturday meeting the SKP Central Committee made it clear to the party's minority faction that the majority faction led by Arvo Aalto will set up parallel party cells and district organizations in the eight Stalinist district territories if need be.

The establishment of new, moderate-controlled shadow districts, at least in the Turku and Uusimaa districts, is deliberately on the agenda of the SKP Central Committee meeting to be held in December.

Both districts are at present firmly in the hands of the party's Stalinist minority.

It was their intention to set in motion the establishment of shadow districts in Turku and Uusimaa as early as this fall, but the decision was evidently postponed because of the recent visit of a CPSU delegation to Finland.

The establishment of new shadow districts would give chairman Arvo Aalto the majority he needs at the special congress in March. Without a bigger majority than at present in the whole party organization, they will not be able to effect the reforms advocated by Arvo Aalto throughout the entire party rank and file.

New Differences Because of Letter

The SKP letter in reply to the CPSU, approved at the Central Committee meeting, has also given rise to a controversy that is dividing the party more than it was before.

In the letter to the CPSU they speak of SKP-CPSU relations in the usual terms as such. In the letter of reply there is, however, a deliberate reference to the position paper issued at the conference held by communist and worker parties in Berlin in 1976. In the paper it is stated that each party has the right to take care of its internal affairs without outside interference.

In that paper "proletarian internationalism," which has in a historical sense meant loyalty to the Soviet Union, was also repudiated. In the paper they speak of solidarity and cooperation between the two parties. The conference, in which representatives from 29 European communist parties participated, in fact nailed down the principle of the parties' greater independence from the CPSU.

In the SKP's letter of reply there is a deliberate reference to the Berlin conference paper. In his speech at the Central Committee meeting on Saturday

Arvo Aalto had already alluded to this. At that time Aalto said that the SKP was ready to continue its relations with the CPSU and the other brother parties in accordance with the principles commonly endorsed by the international communist movement. According to Aalto, the party's independence in its own affairs is included in these principles.

SKP Stalinists do not under any circumstances subscribe to this view as a principle governing CPSU-SKP relations. Endorsing this principle would mean giving the Eurocommunist way of thinking the official seal of approval in party relations and giving up recognition of the CPSU's lead status.

The SKP's letter of reply contains a deliberately indirect reminder of the fact that the CPSU has violated Berlin conference declarations in its behavior with regard to the SKP factional split. The CPSU "understands" the SKP Stalinist minority better than it does the moderate majority led by Aalto.

The congress elections to be held for the special SKP congress will be held in January or February. According to the current plan, the special congress will be held on 9-10 March 1985.

Special Working Group Established

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 1 Nov 84 p 7

[Article: "SKP Position Paper Drafting: Stalinists Participate"]

[Text] A committee in whose activities the party's Stalinist district representatives will also have an opportunity to participate has been appointed to draft the political position paper for the special SKP congress. Meeting on Wednesday, the SKP Politburo gave the arrangements concerning the committee to the Central Committee secretariat to take care of.

Further Steps in Districts

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Nov 84 p 10

[Article: "SKP Moderates Gradually Moving into Stalinist Districts"]

[Text] The moderate majority that controls the SKP is starting to spread at an ever more accelerated rate into the Stalinist district organization territories.

The moderates have already established new party cells in Uusimaa and at the end of last week a committee that covers the SKP district was formed in Tampere to function in the district area "as a cooperative Communist organization to implement the party's main policy line."

The chief organ of the SKP and the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League], KANSAN UUTISET, apparently reported the formation of the committee on Monday. According to KANSAN UUTISET, the committee will not be needed if the SKP's Tampere district starts to act in accordance with congress decisions and policy lines.

The fact that the formation of the Tampere committee is a local action was emphasized on Monday at SKP headquarters in Culture House.

However, similar committees in support of the party Central Committee have already been formed in the two most uncompromising Stalinist districts.

An agent is also being paid to handle moderate affairs in Uusimaa and Turku. In addition several moderate party cells have already been established in Uusimaa and there will be more of them.

In the SKP they are getting ready to set up new moderate district organizations in Uusimaa and Turku if harmony is not restored to the party. With the aid of new district organizations, the present SKP leadership could strengthen the position of the moderates at the special congress to be held during the first half of next year.

The moderate activity that has been set in motion in the Stalinist districts is based on the decisions made at the SKP Central Committee meeting held at the end of October. The Central Committee urged all party district and primary organizations to actively carry out the decisions of the 20th Congress. The Central Committee felt that it was especially important to be active in the eight district organization territories belonging to the TIEDONANTAJA association.

Communists to Meet on Thursday

At the previous Central Committee meeting it was also decided to call a special congress. The details of the congress convocation will be decided on at the December meeting of the Central Committee. The eight Stalinist districts demanded a special congress. The Central Committee decided that all district organizations would be listened to in the preparations for the congress.

With this in mind, representatives of all 17 district organizations will be invited to Helsinki next Thursday. Thus representatives of the nine moderate-controlled and eight Stalinist districts will participate.

The preparation of the special congress is already threatening to begin in an atmosphere of combat since the moderate leadership has accused the Stalinists of trying to return the party to a situation in which two different parties operate under the same roof.

As for the Stalinist districts, Tampere has announced that it will not participate in the special congress if the moderates establish new district organizations in Uusimaa and Turku.

Minority Retreats from Showdown

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Nov 84 p 13

[Article: "Stalinists Do Not Want a Congress That Will Split the SKP"]

[Text] It is clear to the Stalinist district organizations that the splitting of the ranks of the SKP must be stopped and that the Stalinist demand for a special congress must not be used to split the party.

This is how SKP Stalinist minority leader Taisto Sinisalo summed it up on Thursday, when SKP moderate and Stalinist district leaders met in Culture House in Helsinki. Thus Sinisalo left open the question as to whether the Stalinists would stick to their demand for a special congress right to the end.

Stalinist leaders organized a press conference on the party's internal situation at the Koitto Building, to which they marched from the congress in 1969 to hold their own shadow congress.

Going along with Sinisalo, Aarno Nieminen, the chairman of one of the most uncompromising SKP factions, the Uusimaa district, said that the Stalinists would continue the fight "for this party." Stalinist leaders refused to speculate as to whether the situation is leading to an SKP split.

In a joint statement the SKP's eight Stalinist districts expressed the opinion that "the path which the failure of the 20th Congress and the divisive measures the Central Committee has decided on represent is a path that will lead to destruction."

"Dissolution Must Be Abandoned"

The Stalinists are also demanding "a democratically and collectively prepared congress." The Stalinists feel that the reversal of all expulsive and divisive measures is a necessary condition for this.

Stalinist district representatives have announced that they will participate only in the work of those organs drafting congress resolutions that have been constituted without discrimination.

The Stalinists are demanding that the manipulation of members be ended and that a collective inspection of the party membership list be made. Sinisalo was of the opinion that the party majority was procuring additional strength for the special congress through fictitious names before the congress is held.

In the position they have assumed, the Stalinists are also demanding consultations among all SKP factions. According to Sinisalo, former party chairman Jouko Kajanoja should also be invited to the joint meeting on Thursday.

In the position they have assumed, the Stalinists state that the initiative that has been taken for a special congress must not be used to prepare for a congress aimed at widening and intensifying the split.

In the position they have assumed, the district organizations announce that they will not participate in the settling of matters at a congress in which divided districts are represented in order to ignore the will of the members.

Sinisalo stressed the fact that the Stalinists are basing their action "on firm, mutual solidarity" and said that Stalinist district leaders would meet on 17 November.

Sinisalo estimated that, since the Thursday meeting, the party's situation had become more critical than it was before the SKP moderates' Central Committee meeting at the end of October.

At that meeting the party's moderate leadership made an appeal that practically speaking legalized the establishment of moderate activities in Stalinist district territories.

Local committees were later formed in Uusimaa, Turku, Tampere and Joensuu. The Stalinist leadership believes that such activities will be extended to the other Stalinist districts too within the next few days.

Stalinist leaders are also demanding that the SKP Central Committee revoke the decisions made at the end of October at its December meeting.

The fact that the SKP's Uusimaa district refused to reply to the request sent to it by the Central Committee for an explanation of why it conducted activities in Uusimaa against the party leadership also testified to a hardening of attitudes in the SKP on Thursday. As for the SKP's Turku district, it feels that the Central Committee request for an explanation was unwarranted.

"Separate Activities Must Be Eliminated"

On Thursday SKP chairman Arvo Aalto continued to shower invective on the Stalinists. At the meeting of moderates and Stalinists Aalto said that an attempt to continue the fight over the SKP within the framework of separate organizations would with absolute certainty lead to an open split.

Aalto demanded the cessation of separate activities as a necessary condition for unity. Without this, according to him, it will be impossible to demolish the supporting structures.

Aalto said that the SKP Central Committee would decide on the scheduling of the special congress, the agenda items and the grounds for opting for the congress at its December meeting.

Aalto emphasized that the preparation for the congress would take place under the jurisdiction of the Politburo and the Central Committee. Aalto promised that there would be room for different attitudes on the part of the representing comrades in the organs that prepare for the congress.

So far the Stalinists have stayed away from the committees and working groups appointed by the Central Committee.

After the meeting Aalto stressed the fact that the party leadership will not endorse any factional agreements on the preparations for the congress.

In answer to the question on the demand to cease publication of TIEDONANTAJA, Aalto replied that separate activities cannot be stopped unless their structures are demolished.

POLITICAL

FINLAND

SOVIET SCHOLAR VORONKOV REINTERPRETS FRIENDSHIP TREATY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Nov 84 p 6

[Article by Erkki Pennanen: "Soviet Scholar on Finland's Neutrality: Walking a Tightrope Is Not in Keeping with the Spirit of the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact"]

[Text] An impartial attitude to both superpowers under the pretext of "absolute" neutrality and walking a tightrope between their often mutually exclusive views is not in keeping with the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact] and the neutrality policy based on it. This is what Soviet scholar, Lev Voronkov, writes in his two latest books on Finland's neutrality policy.

Voronkov deals with the compatibility of the YYA and our neutrality policy and the whole essence of Finland's security policy in a more frank and interesting manner than perhaps anyone in the Soviet Union has since the interpretations by T. Bartenyev and J. Komissarov that caused a fuss in the mid-1970's.

Unlike Bartenyev and Komissarov, Lev Voronkov is no pseudonym; it is the name of a scholar who works in a research institute that is subsidiary to the Soviet Academy of Science. In a recent Russian-language anthology on the role of the smaller Western European countries, Voronkov presents a favorable picture of Finland's foreign policy and explains to his readers why it is "sometimes described" as a neutrality policy.

In another book on the Nordic security policy ("Northern Europe Needs a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone"), wholly written by himself, Voronkov discusses the essence of Finland's foreign policy, emphasizing more and going into greater detail on the importance of the YYA.

More openly than Bartenyev and Komissarov, he refers to the concept, neutrality policy, but provides it with quotation marks. According to Voronkov, "Finland's neutrality policy" simply means the foreign policy line that is in practice applied and which is based on the 1948 YYA.

Alluding to Bartenyev and Komissarov, Voronkov points out that for Finland the YYA is the basis for the entire country's security policy in both the foreign policy and the military sense. On several occasions Voronkov speaks of the

"internal dynamics" of the YYA, which is why, according to him, the pact encompasses the whole gamut of Finland's foreign policy possibilities from the Northern European situation to the general international situation.

Military provisions

Voronkov reminds us that, unlike the case with Denmark and Norway's participation in NATO, Finland and the Soviet Union have not engaged in any joint readiness actions in peacetime. Such actions are, of course, possible, but only in the event that the threat of an attack has been confirmed in joint consultations between the two partners.

In contradistinction to Denmark and Norway, Finland can itself determine the main lines of its defense policy in peacetime. Of course, according to Voronkov, it follows from the existence of YYA military provisions that the partners must comply with pact obligations in their own defense policies in peacetime as well. This implies that Finland may in a free and sovereign manner engage in those actions in peacetime that will not hamper the effective fulfillment of its obligations in a real situation.

Voronkov acknowledges that it is in Finland's interest to see to it that the military provisions of the pact need never be applied. "It is also particularly important to Finland because the matter involves its national sovereignty and independence. It forces Finland to pursue an active policy of detente and the consolidation of peace.

"Finland's foreign policy leaders above all try to make an effort to ward off a situation in which the whole mechanism of the pact's military policy provisions would have to be set in motion in the required sequence."

Voronkov also touches upon the section in the preamble to the YYA in which Finland's right to try to stay out of disputes between the superpowers is recognized. Like Bartnev and Komissarov, he rejects those interpretations according to which this section would entitle us to speak of Finland's neutrality. Voronkov reminds us that it is not possible to confirm a country's position in terms of international law through a bilateral agreement.

The purpose of concluding the YYA was to influence the development of Finnish-Soviet relations. So, Voronkov argues, there can be neither formal nor substantive contradictions between any of the objectives of the pact and the content of this one section of the preamble.

"Unless we depart from the basis of reality, if such a situation were to arise in Northern Europe, one which is covered in the military provisions of the pact, there would be no room left for Finland to remain neutral," Voronkov writes. An increase in detente and international cooperation in the spirit of the CSCE resolution would lessen the likelihood of such a situation's arising.

Voronkov writes that this is why in Finland's interests we have to strive with all our means to cooperate in bringing about detente and the strengthening of the development of peaceful coexistence. This would make it possible for Finland

to stay out of those superpower conflicts of interest that may arise in other parts of the world.

According to Voronkov too, in many of these cases assuming an attitude toward the superpowers in a spirit of "absolute neutrality" was "inconsistent" when we take into account Finland's interest in relieving international tension and furthering detente as well as promoting disarmament.

The Right and the Wrong Line

According to Voronkov, the logic of the YYA establishes clearcut requirements for Finland in terms of its international behavior:

"Assuming an equally impartial attitude toward the superpowers regardless of their positions on international problems of current importance, walking a tightrope between the often mutually exclusive positions of these powers, playing on the contrasts between East and West and passively following world events without actively participating in attempts to arrive at solutions to problems of current importance in the spirit of detente are not ways of behaving that stem from the logic of the Soviet-Finnish pact. On the contrary, it presupposes efforts to maintain international peace and security in accordance with UN goals and principles."

Voronkov does emphasize the fact that, based precisely on this point of view, in his actions President Kekkonen was "opposed to the basic interpretation of the preamble to the pact."

In both books, however, Voronkov does not hesitate to admit to Soviet readers either that Finnish foreign policy is "sometimes described" as a neutrality policy and that in the West Finland is usually counted among the neutral countries, especially in connection with the CSCE.

"Sticking to the generally recognized standards applicable to a peacetime neutrality policy, it is evident that the most important one in this case is the contents of the policy pursued by Finland, not its description in terms of some concept or other," Voronkov writes, but, as for himself, he provides the concept of a neutrality policy with quotes.

Voronkov feels that the political significance of the YYA and Finland's foreign policy line, which is based on it, generally tends to grow when the international situation gets more complicated. At the same time the policy pursued by the other Nordic countries may also have "a very noticeable negative effect on Finland's international status if they do not take note of the special features of the study of Finnish foreign policy."

All things considered and viewed from the Soviet standpoint, Voronkov offers a positive picture of Finland's foreign policy line while at the same time in some passages in his book on Nordic security sharply criticizing the neutrality policy pursued by Sweden as well as Norway and Denmark's growing commitment to military cooperation with NATO.

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CSO: 3617/21

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PAPER VIEWS VORONKOV'S IDEAS ON FINNISH NEUTRALITY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Voronkov Expresses Himself More Precisely"]

[Text] There are many different kinds of neutrality, as the examples of Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria indicate. They may be based on very determining factors like the YYA between Finland and the Soviet Union. Despite these differences, each nation feels that its general independence is so indisputable and recognized that the designation, neutral state, may be used in referring to it in times of peace. This is also why the idea that we should have to refer to and present our neutrality policy as if it were in quotation marks is repugnant to Finns.

It would be wrong to say that Soviet scholar and Nordic expert Lev Voronkov -- who himself puts Finnish neutrality policy in quotes in his new book -- would recommend that we generally do so. But on the other hand, along with J. Komissarov and T. Bartenyev, Voronkov makes it quite clear that the mention in the preamble to the YYA of Finland's right to strive to keep out of superpower disputes does not entitle us to speak of Finnish neutrality.

Lev Voronkov's book appears at a time when high international tension prevails. He consciously avoids speaking of a crisis, but at this time it can, nevertheless, practically be breathed. In his book on the topic, "Northern Europe Needs a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone," Voronkov's attention is primarily directed precisely toward Swedish-Soviet relations, which he can be considered to have offered new, albeit familiar elements of mutual understanding between Finland and the Soviet Union.

In Sweden they have already gotten to the point of showing their displeasure with them and the reason is obvious. Sweden has always been cautious about committing its foreign policy to pledges by foreign powers. In Finland, on the contrary, we have zealously worked to obtain recognition for our new foreign policy in all nations worthy of consideration.

In Lev Voronkov's opinion, the content of Finland's new foreign policy is more important than all other viewpoints, as we here have all along intended it to be. In commending Urho Kekkonen's order of importance, Voronkov does not feel

it necessary to even mention the fact that that very same Kekkonen procured for Finland's neutrality policy — and without quotes — precisely the recognition of its neutrality which we still enjoy. They did not think of using quotes for it in the Soviet Union either in those days, even if quotes were occasionally seen; they wanted to restore the original usage of the word there, the relationship between tendency and neutrality which had come into being in the strained situation of the end of World War II.

As Voronkov demonstrates, there are no generally recognized standards for the conduct of a neutrality policy in peacetime.

Nevertheless, he — as if reluctantly — admits that Finnish foreign policy should "sometimes" be described as a neutrality policy and the country as neutral. Thus he could scarcely ignore the fact that between Finland and the Soviet Union there is a smoothly functioning, versatile "set of norms" that has evolved and become established during the nearly 40 unbroken years of the YYA. And the reflex effects of this set of norms on communications between Finland and the rest of the world must be regarded as valuable and decisive for our neutrality policy.

Naturally, the book's many-sided opinions cannot be regarded as the statements of Kremlin decision-makers. We must, however, assume that the conclusions reflect official, long-range Soviet policy lines. It is by no means a question of any individual, unofficial notions.

We may also read a clearcut earnestness in the book's "list of right and wrong attitudes." According to it, Finland should avoid "passively observing world events without actively participating in attempts to arrive at solutions to problems of current importance in a spirit of detente." From this we may conclude that the author would like Finnish foreign policy to exhibit an active, prominent role in assuming the initiative in international affairs in Urho Kekkonen's style in the future too. According to Voronkov, the avoidance of application of the military provisions of the YYA — in the name of national sovereignty and independence — downright "forces Finland to practice an active policy favoring detente and peace."

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CSO: 3617/21

POLITICAL

FINLAND

BOOK WARNS SELF CENSORSHIP HARMS UNDERSTANDING OF USSR

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Nov 84 p 16

[Commentary by Goran Schildt, a PhD and author: "Finland Between East and West"]

[Text] Finland's position as a border nation between East and West is the overall theme of Johannes Salminen's new book "Gransland" [Border Country]. Most of all he is troubled by the cynicism which by means of a self-censorship that has become almost instinctive keeps the Finns from all that could be thought to displease the Soviet Union.

When Johannes Salminen in 1963 made his debut as an essayist with his book "Levande och dod tradition" [Living and dead tradition], he had already had time to acquire a reputation as a daring challenger of the conservative tradition of ideas with a number of polemical magazine articles. His doctoral dissertation in 1955 on Jarl Hemmer, regarded by his modernistic fellow contemporaries as a poet who had helplessly missed the boat, as well as his unfashionable interest in religion revealed by his conversion to Catholicism, separated him from the politically and artistically radical circles, to be sure. However, the critical reevaluation of the past which characterized his essays distanced him from the traditionalists. In other words, he stood alone, presenting only himself and his own conscience.

This was a position which fit him like a glove and which since then he has succeeded in transforming into a generally respected and admired position of strength. Now that we are able to look back on Salminen's development from a more than 20-year-old perspective, it becomes clear that he succeeded in catching the best of the wave of social revival which gave the youth revolt of the sixties its idealistic pathos and which tore down the barriers of prejudice and falsification of reality which were in the process of cutting us off from our past, but that, on the other hand, he succeeded in resisting all touches of blindness in the spirit of a Marxism perceived as a revelation of truth. Seldom has the still indisputable strength of liberal openness been demonstrated in a more captivating manner than in the correspondence dialog on today's Finland, published in 1980, "Puhe on Suomesta" [Talk about Finland], in which Salminen and Marxist sociology professor Antti Eskola exchange views. As long as threats of violence are not part of the arguments, the power of conviction and free confrontation of the ideas become a common denominator for all people.

Salminen does not seem to have any inclination for one-piece literary feats, for creating major or cohesive works. He is the elegant foil fencer, who gets in a thrust whenever he sees a gap, whether in the arguments of the conservatives or in those of the radicals. This is why almost all of his books are scrapbooks, where he has compiled debate articles, lectures, travel articles, sometimes expanded and improved from their original form. This applies to his most recent work as well, the little collection of essays called "Gransland" [Border nation] (Alba, about 100 markkas), in which however, five portraits of controversial Finnish authors, who are particularly receptive to Eastern or Western impulses, are entirely new.

The uniting theme this time is Finland's position as a border country between East and West. Salminen is most interested in relations with the East, since these have been controversial and at times even denied. During his childhood and adolescence before the last war, the idea of Finland as the last outpost and defense wall of the West against the barbarism of the East was cultivated, just as the years 1809-1917 were spoken of as "the Russian parenthesis" in the nation's history. Salminen points out that it is instead the years 1918-39 which must be regarded as a parenthesis and that the 1809 decision was evidently definite. The Eastern influence on the country, evidenced already by the Finnish immigration and the first contact with Christianity (which was Greek-Orthodox), did indeed cease several centuries ago with the Swedish conquest, but when Peter the Great moved the Russian capital to the edge of Finland, the result was that the whole situation changed. This finally transformed the country into a part of the Russian security zone, at the same time as favorable opportunities opened up chances for limited Finnish efforts for autonomy.

The study of how these opportunities were utilized during the 1800's and are handled today fascinates Salminen, who in these connections comes up with a large number of acid remarks. One is that in 1809 the Finnish peasantry was fully prepared to die to the last man for the sake of Sweden, as it had been in 1596-97 in the so-called war of clubs, in which it stood on the side of national unity against Klas Fleming's division efforts. At that time the concept of liberation was represented by the Finnish nobility, as it was in 1809. It was a handful of the country's upper-class persons who succeeded in getting the victorious Alexander I to create the autonomous grand duchy, and it was still a part of the country's Swedish-speaking elite, with figures such as J. V. Snellman, Georg Forsman/Yrjö Koskinen and Wolmar Styrbjörn Schildt/Kilpinen, who were determined to change the primitively backward Finnish tribe into a civilized nation.

Snellman is rightly in the focus of Salminen's interest. He was "the revolutionary, who with painful clarity realized that the country was lost if the majority, up to then mute and passive, were not with the help of its language awakened to full national awareness." But he was also the man who imposed the Hegelian stamp that determines the unquestionable authority of the state over the individuals on Finland's cultural and political life. Salminen is not a stranger to the thought that neither during the 1800's nor today can Finland afford the kind of sovereign individualism we meet in England and also

in Sweden. There, it is normal that the individuals follow the voice of their own conscience, even when it contradicts what is called the common interest of the nation, but Finland's exposed position has often demanded the opposite position. Finland underwent its basic course in wise submissiveness under the government of the despotic Nicolai I. While Hungary and Poland revolted, Finland made efforts to gain the czar's confidence and received its reward in 1863, when the country's diet could be convened. The improvements in the position of the Finnish language, the strengthening of the autonomy and the establishment of a flourishing Finnish economy took place under the sign of a calculating loyalty to state authority and a willingness to compromise, which only the ruthless threat of Russification around the turn of the century was capable of breaking through.

It is obvious to Salminen that Finnish politicians of today are acting as top-notch Snellman pupils and that they scarcely have any other choice. On the other hand, he finds it urgent to point out the reverse sides that also exist, and which the successful and self-satisfied Finns of today like to forget. It is all well and good that we have again ended up under the umbrella of a Pax Russica (the last time Finland managed 108 years without such devastating wars as the ones that continually bled the population during the Swedish period) and that our economy is flourishing thanks to the trade with the East. In comparison with other Russian fringe nations we are still privileged regarding democratic freedoms and open contacts with the Western world. But the price we are paying is possibly higher than what is actually demanded.

As a genuine liberal Salminen deplores the fact that Finland, despite its contacts with Russia, has not been able to benefit fully from the cultural impulses offered by this vicinity. Our authors and artists have anxiously looked westward, instead of taking advantage of the unique blossoming of Russian literature in the 1800's, of the exciting modernism in poetry and visual arts after the turn of the century and of today's efforts for renewal in literature. The reasons were obviously twofold: Partly, one was afraid of being "swallowed by the vast Russian population" and therefore preferred to remain on one's own territory. And partly the efforts to keep in the good graces of those in power promoted contacts exclusively with the reactionary establishment and kept the Finns from having contacts with Russia's artistically innovative circles, since these are perceived as hostile to the regime. The resistance to the publication of Solzhenitsyn in Finland sends a clear message in this respect.

Salminen is most concerned about the cynicism which, by means of a self-censorship that nowadays is almost unnecessary and instinctive, keeps the Finns from any gesture that might conceivably displease the Soviet Union. The intent is at any cost not to jeopardize the lucrative export contracts, the soothing praise and the pleasant illusion of steering the right course amid the maelstroms of world politics. In order to counterbalance this attitude, Salminen searches for dissidents, persons who are willing to put a fellow human being or an idea ahead of the collective and its security. "In the long run no cultural life worth its name is possible without room for what is 'irresponsible' and uncomfortable." This danger threatens not only Finland's

cultural life; it threatens that which the ingratiating attitude is said to be saving, namely the very existence of the nation. In "Gransland" we can read some serious words about this, which may be worth reprinting here in extenso:

"Playing along on the conditions of the power itself is anything but free of danger. What happens if all the smart calculations turn out wrong, and naked violence takes over? Behind the tough tactician a scared little opportunist is often hidden, who can easily be given the coup de grace when the time of discussion is over. The nation needs its moral reserves as a last internal line of defense--this is shown by the examples of 1899 and 1939--and if there is nothing but a vacuum instead, all is lost."

"But that is not enough; a functioning world conscience must be a first-rank priority for Finnish security thinking as well. A minimum of global solidarity between the little ones is something which is worth holding on to, even from the aspect of realpolitik. In the long run, selfishness means suicide; isolated temporary gains are not of much help against the total defenselessness which awaits the weak ones, if nihilism is allowed to spread freely."

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CSO: 3650/79

POLITICAL

SPAIN

LIBYAN LEADER'S VISIT SEEN PRODUCT OF REGIONAL NECESSITY

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 27 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Jose Mario Armero, lawyer and journalist: "It Is Also Necessary to Meet with Enemies"]

[Text] Despite all the criticism, the visit to Spain by the mystical leader Qadhafi is considered realistic by the author since it enhances our country's cultural, political and economic presence in northern Africa and neutralizes a Libyan-Moroccan pact that greatly affects us.

Felipe Gonzalez flew over the Mediterranean to return to Madrid. It is not clearly known who commands that sea that is so much a part of us. Spain has always played an important role there. The positions in the Mogreb, especially the conduct of the leader who just left Palma de Mallorca, are worrisome. If the lands that the Mediterranean bathes in northern Africa do not look soothing, the situation a little further away at the other side of the sea is even more disquieting. It is true that Jordan's agreements with Egypt and Israel are now possible but peace will not be effective as long as there are mystical leaders....Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi has been in Mallorca. Curiously, he did not want to leave the Mediterranean despite the fact that the meeting was organized by a Central European politician, Burno Kreisky. After returning to Madrid, Felipe Gonzalez has unquestionably weighed the position and the danger that Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi represents. He has reflected on the negative aspects of the meeting just held but Spain's position demanded a personal meeting. The Libyan regime has failed in its attempt to create a pan-Arab movement in which Qadhafi played the most important role, becoming Nasser's successor. Qadhafi's leadership is more violently contested inside Libya. Qadhafi supports destabilizing movements that are very different ideologically, ranging from rightist traditionalists to leftist revolutionaries. He has been rejected by many countries in the Third World and Western Europe. Qadhafi is repudiated in international circles worldwide. In Africa, especially the Arab world, he is even outside the "resistance front" formed by the more radical countries: Iraq, Syria and the PLO. In order to end that isolation, he has worked for some international accomplishments but with few results. The meeting with Mitterrand was followed by failure to withdraw troops from Chad. The traditional lack of fulfillment of pacts in that zone should be recalled. This led the Libyan representatives to remain impassive toward Moroccan withdrawal.

in exchange for recognition of the Democratic Arab Saharan Republic at the OAU meeting, their first public appearance on the international scene after their newly signed agreement with Morocco. In recent times, always distant from the Mediterranean, Libya has reached agreements with Malta and Greece...ending that isolation has pushed Qadhafi to Palma de Mallorca. The leader of the Libyan revolution is today a prisoner of his own words, his past wishes a policy from which it seems he can no longer escape. Dictatorships many times place their representatives to stay in the same position unless the structure of the dictatorship itself changes. The messianism in which Qadhafi has fallen makes it more difficult to find solutions.

Spain's cultural, economic and political presence in northern Africa must increase. We must not fall into defeatism. The open French retreat from the geographic zone has been followed by a destabilizing presence that is endangering peace in a very broad part of the African continent. Spain must be able to play a small role on the other side of our shores. A more general effort has been made so far is needed. Our security cannot be based, as in the past, on time, on personal "friendship" with the Arab leaders.

The pressures on Ceuta and Melilla and the warnings about the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel enter into play in our foreign positions. It is time to demonstrate our ability to move our pawns to the best advantage of our national interests.

The trouble spot in northern Africa is a constant threat to Spain. It is for us to break out of our traditional isolationism and find allies to help us. In this sense, the policy of consensus in defense, with NATO expanding the security zone to all--absolutely all--Spanish territory, is a good one. We cannot be alone in defending Ceuta and Melilla. The threat that the Maghreb represents has worsened after the agreements between Morocco and Libya were formalized. This greatly affects us and unquestionably greatly concerns the president of the government. This led him to the meeting in Palma de Mallorca. With that meeting we have improved in realism. It was absurd to say that the fact that Ceuta and Melilla are now bordered by a union of states--Morocco and Libya--which is basically defensive in nature did not affect us. The meeting in Mallorca was with Colonel Qadhafi, an enemy of Spain. However, it is often advisable to meet with enemies.

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CSO: 3548/68

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

FINLAND REBUFFED FOR CRITICISM OF SWEDEN'S TIES WITH USSR

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Finland and Our Soviet Controversy"]

[Text] Both Finland and Sweden should avoid falling out with each other. This is not to say that people in the two countries should refrain from voicing their opinions. But politicians who are responsible for the leadership of the respective nations have reason to express themselves only after careful reflection.

The issue has acquired current significance from Sweden's differences with the Soviet Union after the violations of our territory in recent years; the fact that the development of the contacts between Moscow and Stockholm are followed with great attentiveness in Finland is extremely understandable and justified. Helsinki is also likely to realize that Sweden wants to have good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union, however.

On the side of the Swedish government one is, wisely enough, not eager to have an argument because of a few words uttered recently in London by Finland's President Mauno Kivisto. Prime Minister Palme stated on television that we cannot actually do anything about what people are saying in Finland. And at Tuesday's press briefing, Foreign Minister Bodstrom underscored how much there is that unites the Nordic countries.

A certain amount of confusion has probably occurred regarding what Koivisto actually said in London. Judging by a detailed account in conservative AMULEHTI, however, the president replied--to a question about the situation in the Nordic countries--that in Finland people sometimes follow with concern the signs on the horizon. The follow-up question was whether this applied to the present situation in the Swedish-Soviet relations, to which Koivisto clearly and emphatically replied yes. After that, he added that there was much of which people in Finland had a lack of knowledge. In spite of the fact that he believed he would be criticized for it, Koivisto wanted to say that he did not in fact understand what it was all about.

With his words about anticipated criticism, Koivisto is likely to have been referring to Swedish reactions on a few previous occasions when he had touched upon Sweden's relations with the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1983, just after the report of the Swedish Submarine Protection Committee with its direct

implication of the Soviet Union, the Finnish president said that much that had been regarded as clarified, upon closer reflection had not been. In the fall of that same year Koivisto found it "quite obvious" that Swedish reports of submarine violations "in most cases" were "pure fantasy."

No real attacks on Sweden, as can be seen, but a number of small jabs, or whatever they are to be called. On top of this it is all too easy for us to notice a number of other Finnish intonations in open or anonymous statements, officially or in the mass media. One does not want to give advice, or mix in, it is said. But nonetheless it is said that Sweden "overreacted," that the conflict with the Soviet Union is unnecessary. Editor in chief Jan-Magnus Jansson of HUFVUDSTADSBLADET has spoken of "the inflamed public opinion" in Sweden.

The other day HELSINGIN SANOMAT questioned the motives behind Sweden's tough criticism of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The newspaper intimated that Sweden was not really capable of "understanding" Soviet goals, or else that the Soviet Union had not wanted to explain them. Interviewed on Swedish television, the new editor in chief of Aftonbladet, the former press counsellor in Stockholm Ralf Friberg, was of the opinion that Sweden had not succeeded in taking care of its contacts with the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, a rather lengthy series of jabs is the result. The meaning seems to be that Sweden should take advantage of Finland's experiences. Koivisto has actually said that he hopes for a Swedish relationship with the Soviet Union "similar to what we (Finland) have." Finnish reminders of 1939 (when Finland was attacked after not having given in to Soviet demands) have been dismissed much too easily in Sweden, a Finnish newspaper recently wrote. All of this becomes somewhat hard to digest for the Swedes. In our own newspaper debate there is--apart from extremist organs--to our knowledge only one, AFTONBLADET's editor in chief, who has recommended more Finnish behavior, by, for example, equating "Finlandization" with "joint security!"

The fact that the Finns are worried and guard their own confidence-inspiring method of dealing with the Soviet Union, is of course respected in our country. Finnish statesmen deserve much recognition for their successful security policy.

But the irritation and the displeasure which is glimpsed in the Finnish debate would be more understandable if they were really convinced that we were making a lot of fuss for nothing. Now, however, even the Finnish analysis seems to conclude that Sweden has been exposed to Soviet incursions.

Against that background and with the evaluation made by our own government and military leadership, Sweden cannot very well feel shaken by Finnish insinuations and displeasure. These should be regarded with careful consideration. We should not boast about our method. But Finnish criticism does not open an alternate way of negotiation. We must assert our territory according to Swedish traditions and preconditions.

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CSO: 3650/79

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

NONSOCIALIST PARTIES CONTINUE ADVANCE IN POLLS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Dec 84 p 6

[Article by Dick Ljungberg: "Social Democrats Lose Votes in New, Major SCB Poll; Non-Socialists Clearly in the Lead"]

[Text] The Social Democratic losses continue and the non-socialist parties -- including the KDS [Christian Democratic Union]--would have won a clear victory; if the election had been held in November: 51.9 percent as against 46.5 for the socialist bloc. The Social Democrats register distinct losses in favor of the Conservatives and of voters who are undecided.

This is shown by a major analysis of party sympathies by the Central Statistical Bureau (SCB). Interviews were made of 9,000 registered voters during the period 29 October to 19 November.

SCB carried out this type of analysis from 1972 to 1982. After that, they had to be cancelled due to the lack of funds. These semiannual polls have now been resumed. The first was made in May this year.

Most Non-Socialist

The result of the November poll is that the middle, that is to say the Center Party and the KDS together, would receive 17.5 percent. The Liberal Party gets 6.6, the Conservatives 27.8, the Social Democrats 41.7 and the VPK [Left Party-Communists] 4.8 percent.

This means that the non-socialists including the KDS would have 51.0 percent of the party sympathies, as against 46.5 for the socialist parties.

The SCB's account of its results is a little confusing, since it indicates the results in intervals, which is intended to provide 95 percent accuracy, if no errors are present. But the following are the changes for each party from the 1982 election and from the previous poll in May:

The cooperating Center Party and KDS would thus receive 17.5 percent together; the results may vary by 0.7 percent, plus or minus. The Center Party alone would get 13.8-15.0 percent, which is no change since May. In comparison with the 1982 election, the Center Party has lost 0.5-1.7 percent.

If the election had been held in November 1984

	1982 election percent	Estimate November 1984	Change from 1982 election	Change from May 1982
Center party	15.5	13.8-15.0	-1.7- -0.5	-0.9- +10.3
Liberal party	5.9	6.2- 7.1	+0.3- +1.2	0.0- + 0.9
Conservative party	23.6	27.0-28.5	+3.4- +4.9	+1.1- + 2.6
Social Democrats	45.6	40.8-42.5	-4.8- -3.1	-3.6- - 1.9
Left Party-Communists	5.6	4.4- 5.2	-1.2- -0.4	-0.1- + 0.7
Other parties	3.8	4.3- 5.2	+0.5- +1.4	+0.1- + 1.0

This would--approximately--be the result for the parties, if there had been an election in November. If the figures for the middle parties and KDS are added up, the middle would receive 16.9-18.2 percent. SCB indicates its results in intervals, which makes the whole thing a little confusing. But the method is used in order to prevent systematic measurement error.

In November the KDS would get 2.3 percent, which is the same as in May. The KDS had 1.9 percent in the election.

Liberal Party Moving up

The Liberal Party would have received 6.6 \pm 0.5 percent of the votes if there had been an election in November. This is a statistically reliable increase of 0.0-0.9 percent since May. In comparison with the election, the gain is 0.3-1.2 percent. The new party leadership had probably hoped for more.


The Conservatives get 27.8 percent \pm 0.7 percent. This is a distinct gain of 1.1-2.6 percent since May. The Conservatives have increased 3.4-4.9 percent since the election, primarily through net gains from the Social Democrats and the middle.

The Social Democrats would have received 41.7 percent \pm 0.8 percent of the votes in an election in November. This is a statistically reliable drop since May of between 1.9 and 3.6 percent. In comparison with the 1982 election, the decline is 3.1-4.8 percent.

The VPK gets 4.8 percent \pm 0.4 percent in November, which is unchanged since May, but a drop of 0.4-1.2 percent since the election.

Environmental Party

The Environmental Party, which is struggling to enter Parliament, would, if the election were held in November, have received 1.1 percent as compared to 1.5 percent in May. In the 1982 election the Environmental Party received 1.7 percent of the votes.




The statistically assured net flow between the parties from May to November (solid arrows) is shown here.

It shows, for example, that the Social Democrats lost a net of 0.6 percent of its voters to the Conservatives and that as many as 2.6 percent, who in May chose the Social Democrats, now do not know what party to vote for.

The broken lines indicate that there is a tendency toward changing.

- Key:
1. Social Democrats
 2. Conservatives
 3. Center Party
 4. Liberal Party
 5. Others
 6. Don't know



This is the statistically assured net flow between the parties from the 1982 election to November this year (solid arrows). The middle has gained 0.3 percent of the voters from the Social Democrats, but lost 1.1 percent to the Conservatives and 0.4 percent to parties not represented in Parliament. The flows cannot be used to calculate the total change from the 1982 election, since there are flows between the parties and the "don't know" category, for example. First-time voters in 1984 are not included. Broken lines indicate tendencies toward changing.

- Key:
- 1. Social Democrats
 - 2. Conservatives
 - 3. Center Party
 - 4. Liberal Party
 - 5. VPK
 - 6. Others

Altogether, this means that the non-socialist parties have gained 1.2-2.8 percent from May to November, while the socialist parties have lost 1.8-3.3 percent. The non-socialists have picked up 3-4.6 percent (without the KDS) since the election in 1982, while the socialist parties have lost 4-5.5 percent.

Since the SCB interviews such a large number of registered voters, the results can be "broken down" with some accuracy into changes regarding for example profession, age, residence etc.

More Conservative Workers

Among the workers (normally members of LO [Federation of Trade Unions]) a confirmed downturn for the Social Democrats is noted, as well as an equally confirmed upturn for the Conservatives between May and November.

The decrease for the Social Democrats is distinct among goods-producing, professionally trained workers, among whom the VPK instead is making progress. A Conservative gain is clear among service-producing workers.

The Conservatives are also gaining among higher-paid white-collar workers, and there the VPK is losing somewhat. On the other hand, the VPK's share of lower-paid white-collar workers has clearly increased.

Among businessmen as a group, the share of those want to vote for the middle parties has dropped.

Among those who are gainfully employed, the decrease for the Center Party and the Social Democrats is statistically confirmed, as well as the gain for the Conservatives.

Among homeowners as well the Conservative gain is clear, as is the loss for the Social Democrats.

The upturn experienced by the Conservatives between May and November is mainly distributed over the age groups 25-29 years and 35-50 years. The Social Democratic losses are more evenly distributed over the age groups, with a peak for the 35-39-year age group. For the other parties there are scarcely any noticeable differences.

Regionally, the Conservatives have a clear gain in the four-city group, while the Social Democrats are losing. The VPK is gaining in the rest of Stockholm province (meaning exclusive of Stockholm City).

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CSO: 3650/96

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

PALME RETREATING FROM STATEMENTS ON MODERATES, NEUTRALITY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 Dec 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Palme Retreating?"]

[Text] Three days have now passed since HUFVUDSTADSBLADET and SVENSKA DAGBLADET published the interview with Olof Palme which created such a stir, in which, among other things, he touched on the credibility of the Swedish neutrality policy.

Olof Palme and his supporting troops in the Social Democratic press have had plenty of time to explain and establish a foundation for the prime minister's message in the interview.

But this time has not been used to demonstrate the basis for the accusation of the Conservatives. Palme has also not tried to straighten out his own reasoning.

Instead, Palme's blunder in the interview last Sunday has been followed by the usual political cliches in the Social Democratic press.

Palme himself initiated this by pointing out, during an interview in Monday's DAGENS NYHETER, two Conservative members of Parliament, Carl Bildt and Gunnar Hokmark. These two, plus a number of unspecified researchers and professors, were said to belong to the "circles" which undermine the credibility of the Swedish neutrality policy.

Now, Olof Palme had a stroke of bad luck. At the same time as DAGENS NYHETER's Monday issue, in which he named these people, reached its readers, Hokmark was interviewed on the morning news. And unless this Conservative member of Parliament is an accomplished liar, bordering on the pathological, his replies during the interview in the news program show that Palme was completely wrong about him.

And Palme's statements about Bildt were not much better. Already on Sunday, in fact, an interview with the latter had been published parallel with the Palme interview in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, and a very highly developed dialectic capability would truly be required in order to gather from Bildt's unequivocal defense of the Swedish neutrality policy that he should belong to circles which threaten specifically this policy!

Olof Palme's first comments and specific allegations after the Sunday interview only confirmed that his assertions were unfounded.

Consequently, on Monday he chose another line of defense. During a press briefing, which mainly concerned international politics in general, he also touched on the discussion about the neutrality policy.

Now it was said that the statements about the Swedish Conservatives were only a little side track in the Finnish interview. He also maintained that he had not criticized the Conservatives since last spring, with the exception of two lines in his speech to the party congress.

Both assertions were actually incorrect. And neither was the whole matter improved by the fact that Palme immediately afterwards repeated that he harbors deep mistrust of the Conservatives as regards the security policy.

But let us allow Olof Palme to try to disentangle himself from the mess he has gotten himself into by way of yet another few unfounded statements.

This might be acceptable if Olof Palme, wise from the damage he has inflicted this time on himself and his party, would cease to foment mistrust of the firmness of the Swedish neutrality policy.

Let him criticize the Conservatives in general security-political terms. If Olof Palme believes that reinforcing the defense is equal to weakening the Swedish neutrality policy, that is his business. In that respect, a real truce has not existed between the democratic parties for a long time, although the differences between the various parties should also not be overestimated.

And if Palme wants to maintain that the Soviet Union ought not to be criticized in overly clear terms, he may be free to do so as well. On that matter there is definitely no agreement between the democratic parties.

But he cannot continue to involve the neutrality policy. He has now had a period of time for reflection after the HUFVUDSTADSBLADET interview which might reasonably be sufficient. He has not been able to provide any credibility at all for his arguments.

He has not been able to defend his blunder. If he repeats it, there are, as we said in the Monday issue, likely to be others besides SVENSKA DAGBLADET who demand that he should leave his post as Swedish prime minister.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

CONSERVATIVE MP ATTACKS PALME CHARGES ON NEUTRALITY POLICY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 Dec 84 p 3

[Op ed article by Gunnar Hokmark, Conservative member of Parliament from Stockholm province and former chairman of the Conservative Youth League: "Bases His Statement on Lies"]

[Text] Sweden's prime minister slanders the Swedish neutrality policy in a Finnish newspaper. This is the most important conclusion that can be drawn from the most recent Palme incident. The prime minister's message is essentially that without him as prime minister, the Swedish neutrality policy would not be worth very much.

This is depressing for three reasons. First, Olof Palme violates a good principle. Externally, we should--regardless of party affiliation--manifest what we have in common and what we in fact agree on in Sweden--and what is also the most important thing in Swedish foreign policy--namely, that Sweden should be alliance-free in peacetime for the purpose of neutrality in war.

On the one hand, this is the truth, and on the other, such statements also deliver the message that toward the outside we in Sweden stick together. No one should harbor any hopes or notions that the Swedish foreign policy debate has any effect on the common foundation for our security policy. The prime minister is violating this important principle when he maligns Sweden's capability of conducting a credible security policy without himself in power.

Bad Conscience

Second, this type of statement gives other countries an alibi for questioning the credibility of the Swedish neutrality policy. Violations of our borders can be excused by the fact that "not even the former prime minister considers it credible." If the major powers want to, the prime minister's statement can be taken as a pretext for demands for security-political changes in Denmark, Norway and Finland.

Third, Olof Palme bases his statement on lies. He asserts that the "Young Conservatives" profess themselves in favor of an agreement with NATO. That is a lie. He asserts that I should be in favor of a Swedish nuclear weapon. That is a lie.

As an old nuclear-weapons proponent, this is perhaps his own bad conscience that is speaking. In any event, this may be the most saddening part of the prime minister's most recent turns in foreign policy; only with serious untruths is he able to find a basis for attacking the Conservative foreign policy.

Doubt the Capability

The rest of the world has no reason to doubt that the willingness to conduct a neutrality policy is anchored in all of the democratic parties in Sweden. On the other hand, it could begin to doubt our capability. The submarine violations are concrete examples of our capability not being rigidly respected.

And in these matters the memory of the surrounding world is somewhat longer than our own. What we would like most of all to forget, the transit shipments of German troops, took place not because we lacked the willingness to be neutral but because we lacked the capability.

What Olof Palme's inobjectivities and slander are really aimed at is precisely a cover-up of this, which forms the core of the Swedish foreign policy debate, that is to say what military capability we must have in order to assert the neutrality. On that, we Conservatives believe that the defense must be strengthened, precisely in order to protect the credibility of the neutrality policy, while the Social Democrats have accepted the fact that the defense is weakening, despite the violations.

Marked by Poor Judgement

The prime minister is doing harm by using loose statements in order to affect other nations' opinion of Sweden. He is also doing harm with the license he is giving others to question our credibility and by steering the Swedish foreign policy debate away from what it ought to deal with, toward what we agree on.

This is understandable, to be sure. Olof Palme's foreign policy involvement is marked by failures and documented poor judgement.

Despite Palme's praise, Vietnam, Cuba and Tanzania have become warring dictatorships. The vain attempts to become a leading name on disarmament issues have ended up in Bahr and Ferm incidents. The nuclear-free zone has become the subject of threefold and contradictory interpretations by the present government.

Major Difference

The overconfidence in detente during the early 1970's led to the circumstance that Sweden disarmed when others armed. Our inability to assert ourselves against submarine violations is a direct result of that incoherent evaluation. Despite personal assurances from Moscow and despite the prestige and

confidence the prime minister himself has placed in these assurances, the violations continue.

The examples of documented poor judgement of foreign policy issues are manifold. One country, which according to Olof Palme developed its democratic institutions with "pedantic carefulness," is today one of the world's most horrible dictatorships. The prime minister could not even manage a border conflict with Denmark without comparing the Danish prime minister to then Argentine dictator Galtieri.

Against that background it is entirely in line with his style that the prime minister in foreign newspapers slanders the largest opposition party and thus undermines the credibility of our neutrality policy. It is also his style afterward to defend this with untruths about his political adversaries.

But one must admit that there is great difference between him and Per Albin Hansson, who during the years of emergency preparedness declared to the rest of the world that "Sweden's preparedness is good." His successor, in contrast, allows the party's campaign plan to govern foreign policy. That is lamentable.

11949

CSO: 3650/96

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

NICARAGUAN EXPORT CREDITS CHALLENGED--Member of Parliament Anders Bjorck (Conservative) has submitted yet another case for approval examination by the Standing Committee on the Constitution. It concerns the question of whether Prime Minister Olof Palme promised export credits to Nicaragua during his visit there last winter. Bjorck is of the opinion that Palme and Undersecretary Gösta Edgren of the Foreign Ministry should be questioned by the committee. His thesis is that Palme is mixing up his role as prime minister with his "personal international ambitions." [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Dec 84 p 6] 11949

CONCERN FOR MOZAMBIQUE AID--In Mozambique a Swedish relief expert has been murdered by the South African-supported MNR [Mozambique National Resistance] guerrilla. The government in Maputo does not have effective control over its territory. The agreement which it was more or less forced to enter into in February with the apartheid regime is obviously not functioning. At that time South Africa promised to cease military support to MNR in exchange for the South African resistance organization ANC [African National Congress] no longer being permitted to operate from Mozambique. How should a giver of aid react in such a situation? On the one hand it is important for relief experts to work in the field--in agricultural projects; for example--and not limit their contribution to administration at the relief offices in the capitals. On the other, one cannot demand that they should work while endangering their lives. Those best suited to undertake the tremendously difficult evaluation ought to be those on location who are responsible for the aid. But at the same time they also have to assume responsibility for guaranteeing that all that can be done for the safety of the relief personnel is also done. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Dec 84 p 2] 11949

CSO: 3650/96

ERRATUM: This article republished from
JPRS-WER-85-003 of 8 January 1985 where
it was inadvertently published under
Federal Republic of Germany.

JPRS-WER-85-012
2 FEBRUARY 1985

MILITARY

AUSTRIA

MORE FUNDS, EFFORT IN CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNED

Vienna PROFIL in German 12 Nov 84 pp 68-69

[Article by S. M. Gergely and Alois M. Goeschl: "Creep Underground: Crisis Preparation Increased; It is Doubtful For What Emergencies It Can Serve"]

[Text] "It is irresponsible, Professor Dr Gerhard Bruchkmann complains, "that to date so little has been done in Austria for civil defense." The comment of the statistician is reflected in figures: Only five percent of the Austrian population can find a shelter in an emergency. In approximately 400 federal buildings, where shelters are mandatory, a total of 127,288 persons can find secure shelter in emergencies in a total of 754 shelters. But only one-twentieth of the total of 330,000 shelter places can shield from radioactive rays, according to a study by the Seibersdorf research center. "This is an unjustifiable situation," Interior Minister Karl Blecha told PROFIL, "which I do not accept." As a comparison--Denmark provides secure protection to 50 percent of the population, Sweden to 65, and Switzerland even to 80 percent.

On the other hand, the Swiss also expended almost a hundred times more per year than we--400 million francs.

"The Swiss just have a different attitude than we," reasons Karl Rohrbeck, President of the Austrian Civil Defense Association. Moreover, Rohrbeck claims that the former interior ministers Lanc and Roesch had no interest in civil defense matters. Leopold Gratz as mayor was also not active; he argued that it was futile to consider whether one could dig himself in for a week.

This is to be changed. Blecha has scheduled a major civil defense poll for early 1985 to increase awareness; 500 million schillings are to be allocated soon for shelter planning alone.

Blecha's farther plans include:

- Establishment of clear lines of responsibility on the federal level for civil defense,
- Reorientation of the volunteer fire departments to crisis prevention, and
- Equipping the existing shelter with at least minimal protection devices.

What efficient crisis management would cost is debatable. Professor Egon Matzner prepared a study according to which a maximum alternative--a network of shelters with 21.7 million places to be built in the next 25 years--would devour 215 billion shillings; a "minimal alternative", corresponding to two AKH [expansion unknown] buildings, would cost 72.8 billions. Says Blecha, "These figures are not to be taken seriously." Rohrbeck also considers Matner's calculations to be "numerical trickery." Shelter construction will no doubt be expensive, but the decisive factor is said to be a comprehensive conceptualization, including information about alert plans as well as assistance in prevention or during natural catastrophes. Rohrbeck's aim is the crisis proof household and the crisis secure community. Each day rolling bombs in the shape of poison-filled trucks cross Austria; they can cause catastrophes even in peacetime. "The atom bomb," says Rohrbeck, "has quite a low priority." A nuclear exchange is said to be improbable, and the nuclear plants near the borders are said to be sufficiently secure. "In the public," Rohrbeck complains, "civil defense has been cited by many and has on occasion been misinterpreted."

Some pacifists, on the other hand, consider civil defense not only useless, but even dangerous. Peace activist Paul Blau argues that the more a population considers itself secure because of costly shelters, its willingness to support peace is reduced. "Civil defense lowers the acceptability threshold of nuclear war." (Blau) Preparation in Austria for a nuclear catastrophe is said to be quite useless. "This argument," says Blecha, "has some merit." But a fear that preparation would lead to war is just as unjustified as a concern that an excess of physicians will lead to illnesses, replies Rohrbeck. "In that case," adds Vienna's deputy mayor Dr Erhard Busek, "everything that serves prevention should be abolished, including the fire department."

The assumption that radiation proof bunkers are useless in a nuclear war also evokes counterarguments. Professor Herbert Sorentin, director of the radiation defense department in Seibersdorf thinks that people in a radiation proof bunker would have chances for survival as little as 800 meters from ground zero of a one megaton nuclear bomb. This, of course, does not mean that an atomic attack has been overcome--the element iodine 131, a radioactive byproduct of nuclear fission--has a half life of eight days and contaminates water and food for weeks. Even the survivor at that point will probably envy the dead--there would be hardly any medical help for the injured, there would be no electricity nor fuel. An American study has also projected civil disturbances for the period after a nuclear attack--in the search for food looting would be commonplace.

The prognoses become even bleaker on hand of new meteorological calculations, according to which a global temperature decline is to be feared even in the case of a limited nuclear war, since the explosions throw huge amounts of dust and smoke into the atmosphere, darkening the entire earth and hindering all plant growth for months or even years.

Some Austrians, including the FP's young star Joerg Haider, do not care for the predictions but build shelters. The cost of a private shelter for about a dozen people is estimated to range from 80,000 to 250,000 schillings, depending on the facilities (a shelter place in a public building is assessed at 8000 to 16,000 schillings.) The Federal Ministry for Construction and Technology has since 1962 had guidelines for shelter construction, but nobody checks whether they are followed. In cheap shelters slate is often provided instead of the expensive concrete, but slate is porous and thus unsuitable in some crisis situations.

Although nobody knows how many private shelters are functional, the experts are agreed on one point--Austria is as good as unprotected in the case of major crises, especially in the case of war.

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MILITARY

DENMARK

DEFENSE MINISTER, NEWSPAPER COMMENT ON USSR CRUISE MISSILE

Minister: Increased Soviet Interest

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Jan 85 p 5

[Article by Michael Ulveman Jensen]

[Text] Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) regards the matter of the missile which violated Norwegian and Finnish territories as a reflection of increased interest on the part of the East Bloc in the entire Nordic area.

"It is obvious--as was, moreover, stressed from the Norwegian side--that the incident reflects the increased interest of late in the entire Nordic area on the part of the East Bloc countries. However, one should probably not dramatize the situation too much. So far, we know too little about the incident and the technical errors which may have taken place. I have no reason to believe that it was not a question of technical errors on the part of the East. However, it is, of course, a question whether we shall ever find out what happened," Hans Engell tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

The defense policy spokesman of the Liberal Party, Peder Søndersby, says that the situation will have to be considered more closely on the part of Denmark, among other places in the committee recently set up to discuss Denmark's security.

There have not yet been any political reactions from the parties of the left wing, nor from the peace movements, which traditionally are fast to comment on issues concerning our security.

"I am sure that both the political reaction and the priority given to the entire matter in the TV News would have been different if it had been a question of an American missile. However, it usually is not the activities on the other side which have the great interest of the left wing," Hans Engell states.

New Burden on Soviet Ties

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Jan 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Missile Gone Astray"]

[Text] It is hopefully somewhat ironic that a Soviet cruise missile strays into Norwegian air space to disappear over Lapland. Finland has lately been making persistent assurances that measures will be taken to prevent cruise missiles from flying over Finnish territory. These are assurances which naturally were made to the gratification of the Soviet Union and as a warning to the Atlantic powers which might conceivably consider the possibility of shooting missiles from vessels in the North Atlantic via Norwegian air space toward Soviet territory. It seemed that nobody could conceive of a traffic of this kind in the opposite direction. The purpose of the assurances was to establish that Finland itself will be in a position to ensure its neutrality and prevent such violations so that Finnish air space cannot be abused to the detriment of Soviet interests.

It probably is ironic that it is, indeed, a Soviet practice missile which happened to demonstrate that Finland is not in a position to do that, at any rate not yet. The more unpleasant interpretation would be that the missile was sent astray on purpose--in order to test the reactions on the part of Norway and Finland to such a stray missile, to warn Finland that carelessness may have consequences and to indicate that the Soviet Union, in such a case, will regard the neutral glaxis outside its territory as a natural defense area. For this is what happens time and again when Soviet submarines violate Swedish territory: in doing so, the Soviet Union indicates that the area will be used by the Soviet Union in a situation of war.

The Norwegian Armed Forces have acted in an entirely correct manner toward the Soviet violation, in a formal and well-considered manner. An unidentified flying object appearing on the radar screen is not summarily shot down--for the very reason that it has not been identified and that it may be an aircraft. The Norwegian Armed Forces note the infringement, assuming that it was a mistake and, after an appropriate lapse of time, make it the subject of a political reaction.

The time lapse was one week: the incident took place last Friday, and everything would have been a lot easier if the Soviet Union itself had taken the opportunity to make excuses in a sensible and decent manner to the Norwegian and Finnish government for the erroneous maneuver. They now have to go through the not very productive process of protests and denials of every act in which they were not caught. This causes a further strain on the relations between the Nordic countries and the Soviet Union which ought to have been avoided--unless there was an underlying purpose.

1261

CSO: 3613/74

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

NATO FRIGATE 90 CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE DISCUSSED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Nov 84 p 30

[Article by Wolfgang Flume: "Is the Frigate 124 Coming Earlier?"]

[Text] In the 1990's, the navy must replace the last three frigates of the Koeln Class and the four destroyers of the Hamburg Class through new construction. This is to occur through seven units of the NATO Frigate 90--the German designation is Frigate Type 124--now in the conceptual phase. In the mid-1990's, however, the other military services will also have procurement programs which, the navy fears, could have a certain displacement effect on navy planning. This is especially true for the Fighter Aircraft 90.

Therefore, the navy is now considering whether or not the frigate program can be moved up to the point where the drain of resources will be substantially over (around 1995-96), when the Fighter Aircraft 90 is in line for procurement. This may then also affect the NATO frigate program, which, according to present plans, foresees the beginning of the sea trial of the lead ship by the end of 1992; the commissioning would then be in 1994. If, however, the navy is to receive its seven frigates by 1995-96 with a delivery rate of 6 months, then that would mean the delivery of the first ship as early as 1992-93. The NATO program would thus have to be accelerated somewhat and Germany, contrary to the original intention, would suddenly be "lead nation."

The Tactical Requirement for the Frigate 124 was approved on 28 February 1984 with these conditions: fulfillment of the alliance commitments, utilization of the multinational conceptual phase and--likewise to reduce costs--use of the agency capacity for project management. Should the navy be able to move the frigates up, then the international conceptual phase would have to be concluded by the beginning of 1986 and the definition phase--it is to be hoped that it will be carried out with many NATO partners--by the end of 1988 so that the construction contract can be signed no later than 1989. Despite all of the internationalization and standardization being sought for the NATO frigates, the seven German ships are nevertheless to be built at German shipyards, and that according to the international construction standards worked out for the NATO frigate. The component assemblies are also to be of German production if possible. Only secondarily is other European equipment to be used, and non-European equipment only when its performance makes it absolutely necessary. But even then it is to be produced here under license.

In contrast to the NAOC frigate designed more for antisubmarine tasks, the German Frigate 124 is needed more for anti-air-warfare (AAW) tasks, hence for air defense over a limited area. This calls above all for equipping the over 3,500-ton ships with different weapons. The additional antisubmarine task is to be realized through a helicopter stationed on board. Because high speeds are not required for these frigates, the chances for a purely diesel drive ought to be good, especially since it results in lower costs in the utilization phase. Generally that means a limiting of the size of the budget for equipping the seven frigates to what is operationally absolutely necessary.

9746

CSO: 620 192

MILITARY

FINLAND

ARMED FORCES COMMANDER DETAILS LONG-RANGE PRIORITIES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Nov 84 p 10

[Article: "General Jaakko Valtanen: Installation of Radar Monitoring System Soon to Be Completed"]

[Text] At the inauguration of the 93d national defense course in Helsinki on Monday the commander of the Armed Forces, Gen Jaakko Valtanen, drew attention to the development of our country's ability to maintain surveillance and prevent violations of our territory. Among other things, he reported that the low monitoring system assembled here in Finland is in the final state of installation operations as is also our aerial reconnaissance division's modern data transmission system based on automatic data processing.

"Sensory aerial reconnaissance data transmission is also being automated," Valtanen reported. According to him, the importance of sensory aerial reconnaissance is increasing since Air Force equipment has become capable of flying at low altitudes. Valtanen said that our ability to organically tie the identification and prevention of territorial violations into our aerial reconnaissance will be improved when we soon obtain fighter planes capable of all-weather operation that are permanently based in Southwestern Finland.

General Valtanen further noted that the missile-equipped boat squadron now under construction will add to our naval defense performance ability. He said that the fixed coastal artillery, now being completely renewed, and the missile antiaircraft batteries also constitute a permanent, ready-for-action defense system for the capital. The so-called defense troops' ability to act is at the present time being improved to increase ground forces readiness.

Finland May Not Be Used for Military Purposes

According to General Valtanen, the object of all these military operations and preparations is "to give the outside world a firm signal that Finnish territory is not to be used for military purposes."

In proceeding in this manner, we are also demonstrating our concern for our Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact obligations, the cornerstone of our security policy, Valtanen went on to say.

Valtanen said that the international situation is described as being tenser than it has been since the Cuban crisis. At the same time the security policy debate and the superpowers' military interest is now being focused to a growing extent on Northern Europe.

According to General Valtanen, in Finland we assume that a situation in which peace wavers and superpower relations become strained to nearly the point of war is more likely than outright war. A crisis may in a given situation escalate into open warfare, but Valtanen feels that a nuclear war is very unlikely.

"If the situation in Europe escalates to the point of war, it will be a violent and short war, lasting perhaps only a few weeks and one that is waged with conventional weapons. The use of nuclear weapons in connection with such a war must be regarded as extremely unlikely," was Valtanen's picture of such a war.

According to Valtanen, foreign policy leaders' actions will be supported by an extensive assemblage of national defense measures and instruments. "We don't want to get caught up in a crisis as a helpless pawn," he remarked.

"What is at issue is the defense of our independence and the chances of survival of our citizens in any situation. In this matter slogans are not enough. We need actions and practical readiness," Valtanen emphasized.

Defense Minister Veikko Pihlajamäki (Center Party) has urged the formation of a new parliamentary defense committee. According to this minister, any day now all parliamentary parties will receive letters sounding them out on this.

Speaking at the inauguration of the national defense course, Pihlajamäki proposed that a fourth defense committee's mission be "to investigate the current security policy situation and deliberate on the improvement of our Armed Forces for the next 5-year period."

The defense minister pointed out that the defense committee method has already demonstrated its undeniable advantages in providing systematic bases for the improvement of the Armed Forces. According to him, this has also produced economically advantageous solutions.

The defense minister, however, disputed the notion that the parliamentary defense committees are golden geese to produce funds for the generals.

"Fortunately, there is enough of a sense of humor in our Defense Ministry, since one cannot take such claims seriously. Every improvement program recommended by a defense committee has been stripped as concerns the Armed Forces' own proposal. The committees have tried to adjust defense expenditures to the nation's general framework of expenditures as best they can. Regrettably, we have only had to in practice compromise on these proposals," Pihlajamäki remarked.

11,466
CSO: 3617/21

MILITARY

FINLAND

PARTIES ASKED BY GOVERNMENT TO GIVE VIEWS ON DEFENSE PANEL

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Nov 84 p 7

[Text] The government has asked all of the parliamentary parties for their views on a fourth parliamentary defense committee. The parties will have a chance to say whether we need this committee and what it ought to do.

This was decided at the government's evening session on Wednesday on the basis of inquiries sent to the parties. They are trying to assemble the party opinions before the end of November. Defense Minister Veikko Pihlajamäki (Center Party) said after the evening session that, if the parties assume a favorable attitude toward the committee, it will probably be formed in December.

In 1981 the Third Defense Committee drafted a recommendation for the development of the Armed Forces in 1982-1986. In addition the committee formulated 15-year guidelines for the development of the Army. The Third Defense Committee was of the opinion that a fourth committee should be put to work in the event that a particular need should arise.

According to Pihlajamäki, there is no particular need for a new committee but, in his opinion, a fourth committee is in order so that they can continue the dialogue between civilian decision-makers and generals and then too a new 5-year recommendation is appropriate.

For his mission Pihlajamäki advocates a much-reduced committee. Such a mini-committee would only draft a 5-year appropriations framework for the Armed Forces, but would not get deeply involved in a security policy discussion.

The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] and especially its first secretary, Jorma Henttilä, have reacted more clearly to such a reduced appropriations committee. SDP [Social Democratic Party] experts have also criticized the use of committees in carrying out the wishes of the generals.

According to Henttilä, the Armed Forces' next 5-year appropriations program can be handled as an official task on the basis of the Third Defense Committee report. In Henttilä's opinion, a committee is not needed to do this. However, Henttilä would like to have a committee that would consider what changes the development of nuclear-weapon technology and strategies will have on Finland's military policy position and its Armed Forces.

Chief editor Jan-Magnus Jansson (Swedish People's Party) headed the three earlier defense committees. According to Pihlajamäki, they have not yet considered who the chairman and members of a fourth committee would be.

The government did not go into a consideration of the need for a new committee during its evening session either. It merely decided to request statements on it of the parties.

Bills Governing Civil Servants to Go to Parliament Soon

During its evening session the government also received a report on the reform of civil servant legislation that has been discussed for years now. The Finance Ministry and civil servant organizations have reached agreement on the key points of controversy involved in this legislation, but some details have yet to be ironed out.

Second Finance Minister Pekka Vennamo (Finnish Rural Party) has promised that proposals on civil servant laws will be presented to Parliament before the end of the year.

The originally proposed change in the constitutional regulations governing civil servant rights has given rise to the most debate. The regulations it is proposed be changed would, among others, affect the creation of posts, the grounds for promotion and civil servants' legal status. In the TVK [Confederation of Salaried Employees] civil servant organizations, among others, they are dissatisfied with these changes.

In the report of the committee that deliberated the matter, the aim was, among other things, to speed up the procedure for creating posts and to emphasize training instead of years of service. In the drafting of civil servant legislation, they also rejected the possibility that, for example, the performance of a national, municipal or political confidential mission would be regarded as "a particular merit" in appointing officials.

Parliamentary Museum in Kauhajoki

During the evening session Defense Minister Pihlajamäki was appointed the government's representative to the inauguration of the Parliamentary Auditorium Museum on 1 December in Kauhajoki.

The museum is in remembrance of the fact that Parliament convened in the auditorium of the Kauhajoki Coeducational School during the Winter War and for a short time after it, that is, from 1 December 1939 to 12 November 1940.

11,466
CSO: 3617/21

ERRATUM: This article republished from
JPRS-WER-85-003 of 8 January 1985 where
it was inadvertently printed under
Federal Republic of Germany.

JPRS-WER-85-012
2 FEBRUARY 1985

MILITARY

SWITZERLAND

AIR FORCE PILOTS TO TRAIN IN SARDINIA

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 14 Nov 84 p 22

[Article by Peter Amstutz: "Switzerland Has Become Too Small for Fighter Training"]

[Text] Berne--The traditionally peaceful Swiss are about to "conquer" new lands in the Mediterranean. Starting 7 January next year Swiss fighter pilots are about to start from the Decimomannu training base in southern Sardinia on air combat training flights over the Mediterranean. The approximately 650 professional and militia pilots of the neutral Alpine land are to be confronted by "warlike and realistic situations to the maximum extent possible," according to the Federal Council in Berne. However, their own territory has become too small for high-speed supersonic missions. Frequent citizen complaints as well as the danger that sonic booms may trigger avalanches in the mountains have had the effect that the "Tiger," "Mirage," and "Hunter" pilots with their approximately 300 aircraft are hardly able to fly serious training missions under full power at less than 10,000 meters. Some 10 months ago, Berne "discovered" Sardinia as an alternate solution. Some 25 kilometers northwest of the capital and port city of Cagliari, on the Campidano plain, Mussolini's government had in 1941 built a landing field for Hitler's Wehrmacht. Beginning in 1956 the Italian air force expanded the facility according to NATO standards, and placed this inscription over the gate to the barbed wire enclosed area: "On this air force facility the best Italian, German, and Canadian pilots are trained."

Now the Swiss are also to have the chance to practice demanding supersonic dogfights over Mediterranean waves on at least 14 of the 320 annual clear days. The current users of the Decimomannu include also the Americans, British, and occasionally the French.

As early as January the first 18 to 20 professional pilots (trainers) of the federal surveillance squadron, i.e. Berne's permanent air patrol, will be transferred south, provided the Berne parliament will allocate the funds. Some 60 civilian aircraft maintenance experts will go along on the trip to Sardinia, because the Swiss will take along six each unarmed Northrop 5E "Tigers" and "Mirage 3s". For neutrality reasons the use agreement considers the Swiss pilots during their training abroad not as military persons but as federal officials.

The air force command in Berne expects the trip into the NATO area to result in "a considerable increase in combat readiness" and the pilots with Sardinia experience are to transmit that knowledge at home to the next generation. Up to now the Swiss fighter pilots had to go abroad merely for weapon trials, since their own country is too small for firing long distance air-to-air missiles. Test firing from aircraft of the Alpine republic routinely take place in Cazaux near Bordeaux (France), at the Nellis Air Force Base near Las Vegas, Nevada, as well as at the Swedish Vidsel near the Polar Circle.

9240

CSO: 3620/136

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

'NEW POVERTY' ROOTED IN FAULTY LABOR MARKET STRUCTURE

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 30 Nov 84 p 21

[Article by Dr Meinhard Miegel, director, Institute for Economic and Social Policy, Bonn:"..."]

[Text] Since the middle of the Seventies, but above all since the beginning of the Eighties, the weakest economic households are declining in the social structure, and at the same time their number is increasing. In the last ten years in the Federal Republic, by way of example, the gap between middle-income/middle-purchasing-power groups and the poor has increased by about 15 percent. And since 1980 alone the number of those who are considered needy has increased by about 14 percent. In this, it is especially noteworthy that the number of households which are not only in special circumstances, but also continually in need of help, has increased greatly above the average figure.

There is disagreement over the reasons for this development, which is regarded by many as the path into a "new poverty". For the ruling parties, the decisive causes are the slowing of growth in the economy and the necessity of having to pay off "inherited burdens" from the time of the socialist-liberal coalition. According to the view of the social democrats and the unions, the "new poverty" is the result of the "politics practiced by the Federal Government, which contribute to the creation and reinforcement of poverty through its supply-oriented economic policies and the reduction of social benefits." Finally, the Greens see in this development the consequence of our societal relationships, which "produce social and psychic misery for the masses" and are responsible for "more and more want of livelihood from more and more people".

None of these explanations can satisfy the impartial observer. Slowed growth in the economy is not a sufficient justification for the increasing drift in income in the population. Other factors must be at work here. And the "new poverty" can only partially be blamed on the "inherited burden".

Similar Developments In All Industrialized Countries

No better is the argument of the social democrats and unions, who are not able to explain why the "new poverty" demonstrates similar developments and forms of appearance in practically all industrialized countries, independent of whether the government is formed by Rightists or Leftists, Conservatives, Liberals, or Socialists. Whether in Italy, France, Great Britain, the USA, or the Federal Republic--despite many differences in individual details -- the trend is constantly the same: the poor become relatively poorer and at the same time more numerous.

But even the Greens can be convincing. For the social and psychological misery of the masses as seen by them, in reality, cannot be proved. The social relationships in the western industrialized countries cause quite a few things, but they obviously do not cause misery on a huge scale.

In order to shed light on the essence of the "new poverty" and to uncover its causes, a distinction must be made between two developments: 1) the relative, and once in a while total decline of the economically weakest households in the social structure, and 2) the numerical increase of these households. There are commonalities between both developments, but still more serious differences.

The Logical Consequence of A New Polarization of Incomes

Insofar as the "new Poverty" paraphrases the relative loss in affluence of the economically weakest households, that poverty is the logical consequence of a renewed polarization according to income and wealth and, to be sure, not so much between the richest and the poorest, as rather between the poorest and the population layers that are slightly above the average in prosperity. After many years of leveling the pendulum now seems to be swinging back-- quite independent of the political orientation of a given country.

In this respect the Eighties resemble the Sixties. At that time, too, the population was prepared to tolerate considerable differences in income and wealth -- to be sure, more so in the upper income strata than in the lower ones. Only at the end of the Sixties did the picture change. Sensitivity to questions of distribution of income and wealth increased, and reduction of inequality in the material realm jumped sharply upwards on the list of political priorities.

But it lasted only a few years, and the opposite trend was in the offing again. In the middle of Seventies even a socialist-liberal coalition considered itself unprepared to raise the social income of the economically weakest households according to the general raises in income. Not without reason did the coalition fear the resistance of its broad strata of voters: the middle income recipients.

Viewed precisely, the "new poverty" in the sense of the relative decline of the economically weakest begins already with the chancellorship

of Helmut Schmidt in 1974. For although the available income of private households, from the beginning to the end of his term of office, grew in real wealth about 10 percent, the social benefit allowances remained realistically constant until the change of administration in 1982. And that meant that approximately a half a million households declined in the social structure--they became relatively poorer.

In this matter, after 1982 no change in the trend was introduced but a trend that was in existence was merely accelerated. In real money, payments of social benefits went backward. To be sure, at the same time the available income of the majority of private households also sank. This may have decisively contributed to the fact that there was a decline in the readiness of broader circles of the population to do more for the economically weakest. However, basic changes in conduct and awareness were added which were mainly the premise for the political change on power.

As relevant investigations show, the widespread public opinion for years has been: improvement of the economic condition of the needy strata in the population--yes!, but not at our expense. The unions have to struggle against this opinion continuously, when their hoped for improvement in working conditions leads to actual reductions in income among the employed through shortening of the work hours. If the majority follows such a strategy at all, it does so only unwillingly.

At present, this position is characteristic for the political majorities in almost all industrialized nations. In the last few years, whenever a more uniform distribution of income and wealth was attempted, as in France, this attempt came up against the resistance of astonishingly large segments of the population. In contrast, those governments which not only tolerate considerable differences in income and wealth, but even openly speak in favor of them, as in Great Britain and the USA, enjoy remarkable public approval.

In contrast to the Seventies, the Eighties are not the period of sharing -- according to all appearances--but rather the time of amassing material possessions. The political left would get to feel this even in the Federal Republic, if they would raise the issue of sharing more than just rhetorically.

Today, no one is able to say how long the unwillingness of the well-to-do majority to become involved more deeply for the needy minority will persist. If, under the term "new poverty" one understands only the drifting apart of the needy and from the more prosperous strata of the population, this development can last years. Especially because it cannot be explained rationally alone. Rather, mostly spontaneous convictions play an important role here; for example, the questions: how large can, should, or even must the income and wealth gradient be in a functional society. Which differential is the society ready to accept? Or what gradient does the society need in order not to lose its dynamism?

The response to these questions is a political issue of the first magnitude. Perhaps these are even the most politically serious questions that a society has to answer. But perhaps precisely for these reasons these questions are never treated explicitly or conclusively. In free democracies, in which a certain income and wealth structure can only partially be determined through politics, the answer to such questions changes constantly.

Theory of Continual Leveling Not Tenable

As is to be verified clearly in the history of the Federal Republic and many other similarly organized political entities, phases of relatively distinctive unequal distribution of wealth follow other phases in which majorities want the above-average affluent households to assume the greater burden in favor of the economically weak households. But even these phases of leveling are superseded by phases of greater polarization. The wide-spread opinion, that income and wealth always level out, does not stand up to a sober examination.

The current equanimity of the great well-to-do majority opposed to the minority that is becoming relatively impoverished may be perceived as cynical by those who are affected. However, it is part of political reality. This reality could be so much the more lasting, since even the poorest in the western industrialized countries, viewed objectively, still receive quite a considerable welfare income, in spite of their decline in the prosperity framework. In comparison on an historical and international basis, they appear to be needy only against the backdrop of a thoroughly affluent society. The prosperity of the large majority makes a minority appear poor.

Even the German Federation of Labor Unions sees that in its publicity-seeking study on "The New Poverty". But it refrains from drawing conclusions therefrom. Thus, in this study, one seeks in vain for an indication that the single-person household in the Federal Republic, which receives welfare benefits, has at its disposal the same actual income as the average wage earner at the beginning of the Fifties, or that the economically weakest two-person household in 1984 does not have less than the completely normal three-person household in 1950.

In long-term comparison, the minimum provisions guaranteed by society (i.e., today's welfare) has developed even better than net wages for work. While in fifty years welfare payments have almost completely quadrupled in real money, net wages for work have increased only 3.4-fold.

For the poverty experts of the German Federation of Labor Unions (DGB) that is not everything. With the little bit of welfare, they say, one can perhaps live well in Calcutta, but not in Munich or Dortmund. That is doubtlessly correct. The welfare recipient in Munich or Dortmund cannot "live well". He can live precisely the way the average citizens there lived thirty years ago.

Our Poor Could Live Well in Calcutta

And it is also correct that he could "live well" in Calcutta, indeed, that he would be a member of the local comparatively affluent upper stratum and, to be sure, not because he could buy a particularly large amount, but because he could buy so much more than most of the others. Outside of the western industrialized countries, only a minority--often by dint of long, hard work--achieves that which society here guarantees everyone who belongs to it.

Certainly, historical and international comparisons are only of limited value. For, without doubt, poverty and wealth, like luck and misfortune, are, above all, relative conditions. And it is quite correct that the single-person households with a monthly welfare income of 700 DMarks or the three-person households with a minimum available income of 1,400 DMarks travel along constricted economic pathways in Munich or Dortmund.

In contrast, however, refusal to use historical and international comparisons--and herein the argument of the Greens, the Unions, and the Social Democrats suffers--leads to loss of standards. To wit, measured according to that which men in this world accomplish nowadays, that which was achieved in the western industrialized countries in a short time is extraordinarily impressive.

No one, even the poorest in our country, is served by minimizing the achievements of this society, especially in the social area. Historical and international comparison shows the following: in the western industrialized nations all citizens have achieved an affluence level that few could imagine only two generations ago, and even today most men on earth can only dream about having.

If one measures the societal conditions in the western industrialized countries according to their economic results, then they cannot be so bad. This is true not only with respect to the global development in income and wealth, which could hide a considerable amount of poverty, but expressly also with respect to the distribution of income and wealth.

Income and wealth are distributed particularly uniformly in the Federal Republic. Here the richest household--ignoring a handful of the super-rich--is twelve times as affluent as the poorest of the same size. In other countries the gap is greater.

Differences in Income Lesser Than Elsewhere

The income distribution in the most important western industrialized nations shows this clearly, also. Thus, at the end of the Seventies, the economically weakest fifth of the population at the Federal Republic disposed of over 8 percent of the total available income, as opposed to 7 percent in Great Britain, 6 percent in Italy, a good 5 percent in France, and barely 5 percent in the USA. At the same time, the income

share of the most affluent tenth (of the population) at 24 percent was less than in Italy (28 percent), France (30 percent), and the United States (33 percent). Solely in Great Britain was the income share of the most affluent tenth at 23 percent insignificantly less than in the Federal Republic.

Under these conditions, the relative impoverishment of a minority is not an urgent matter for the great majority of the population. On the contrary, receptiveness in matters of loss of affluence by social benefits recipients appears much more to be diminishing. Many still consider the social mesh to be too tightly woven.

Most citizens perceive the steady rise in the number of needy quite differently. To be sure, the absolute numbers are still within bounds. But the trend gives rise to concern, when the number of households which draw continuous help for livelihood from welfare offices more than doubles inside of six years and swells to 'way over a million'. At the same time, the numerical increase in welfare recipients who give loss of job as reason for their need is especially worrisome. In 1980, their percentage of the population was still below 10 percent. Today, according to estimates of the municipalities it amounts to about 25 percent. In regions of above-average employment, the percentage of unemployed among the recipients of continuing aid for livelihood is said to lie even as high as 40 percent.

The Problem Is The Duration of Unemployment

The primary cause for this development is not so much the number of unemployed as it is the length of their unemployment. If, in 1981, the unemployed individual was--on the average--without employment for only a good seven months, today the average is already at about one year with a further tendency to climb. Presently, approximately 750,000 persons have been without work for more than a year. That corresponds to a third of all unemployed people. More than 200,000 potential employees have been without employment even longer than two years. And their number is increasing rapidly, too.

The situation of the unemployed is aggravated by increasingly more difficult work requirements for benefits in social insurance, as well as cuts in earnings-related benefits and unemployment benefits.

Through a series of legal measures the following has taken place since 1981:

- the insurance waiting period has been lengthened,

- overtime wages and similar extras have been eliminated from calculation of earnings-related benefits and aid,

- the relationship between length of employment and length of claims for payments from the social insurance has been changed to the disadvantage of the unemployed,


--earnings-related benefits and unemployment benefits have been reduced from 68 percent to 63 percent as well as 58 percent to 56 percent, respectively, of the last net wage figure, with the exception of households with children.

The foreseeable consequence of these measures was a distinct drop in the percentage of the unemployed who can claim payments from the unemployment insurance. In September 1984 only 62 percent of the unemployed still had insurance claims. Of these, 56 percent received earnings-related benefits and 44 percent received unemployment benefits. At the same time, the percentage of recipients of unemployment benefits will soon be larger than the percentage of recipients of earnings-related benefits. At the same time, the percentage of those who can make valid claims at all will decline further.

In this, the future development is mapped out. Most unemployed, who have no more insurance claims, sooner or later will sink to the threshold of welfare. Primarily, this fate is suffered by foreigners, who often have only meager reserves at their disposal, but yet have families with many children. If the recipient of welfare in earlier times was, as a rule, incapable of work, sick, or old, he is today increasingly unemployed and has an abundance of children. This leads inevitably to changes in the social make-up of the economically weakest part of the population, to changes which could gradually lead to a politically explosive situation.


Herein lies the real dimensionality of the "new poverty". The foremost problem is not that there is poverty per se in such a nation as the Federal Republic. For thanks to existing social conditions this poverty here, as in other western industrialized nations, is today more bearable than anywhere else in the world. The problem is also no so much that the degree of poverty has been increasing again according to a tendency for some time. For the polarization and leveling of income takes place in phases which depend on the emergence and passing of political majorities. The actual problem of the present development consists therein, that the primary distribution system, the labor market, shows defects which can lead to the impoverishment of entirely normal population groups!

We cannot take comfort from the fact that the number of potential workers who are really ready and willing for work, but have become welfare recipients, is, for the time being, still quite small. The political challenge is namely not the fate of the individual, no matter how hard it might be. By far more meaningful is the credibility of the principle that everyone has a fair chance to achieve an income through his own efforts. If this principle should lose credibility within the population, the consequences for the existing economic and social order would be incalculable.



1. Open and Hidden Unemployment (in 1,000s)
2. IFO Estimate
3. Registered Unemployed
4. Others Looking for Work
5. Total People Seeking Work

The official statistics of the Federal Institute for Labor show only those men and women who report as being unemployed at the employment offices. Not included are those who want to work but cannot find a job and still do not report as being unemployed.



1. The unemployed:
2. Is the Social Network Holding Together
3. 1984 - only for the first half of the year
4. Recipients of:
5. Earnings-related benefits in 1,000s
6. Unemployment benefits (in 1,000s)
7. Welfare due to loss of job

Because of long-lasting unemployment, the number of those unemployed whose claims for unemployment have run out, or who have had no opportunity to earn such a claim, is climbing rapidly. They have to depend on unemployment benefits or welfare.

This is so much the more true, since a portion of the population of the Federal Republic has already written off this form of order. What is taking shape today among the Greens is the fact that none of the strengths is aimed at further developing present economic and social conditions according to the changes in living and environmental requirements. Instead of that, they avow that they want "to overcome".

Unsuitable Strategies of the SPD and Trade Unions

The alternative strategy of Social Democrats and the Labor Unions is the preparation of remedies that -- in the Seventies -- had already proved to be unsuitable: governmental work programs and shortening of the work period without neutralizing costs (i.e., with a more or less complete balancing out of income).

In contrast to that, the Government and the parties that support it are undeterredly putting their stakes on an upturn that is supposed to solve all problems. But that's some time in coming. Thus, neither of these strategies is highly promising. They give ground to the fear that, for the time being, the new poverty will last even longer because of long-lasting unemployment.

But the development must not continue further in the direction taken up till now, nor at the same speed, if severe consequences in taxation are to be avoided. The prerequisite for this is the reform of the labor market. Not in the sense of the Greens, whose concepts are unsuited for taking a turn for the better not only for the unemployed but even more for the poor.

However, in putting the labor market in order progress must be achieved if, one of these days, the new poverty is not to place existing social relationships in doubt. To prevent this, unusual efforts and, above all, new ideas are mandatory. The Government, but also mainly the parties to the wage agreements, bear a deep responsibility in this matter.

12521

CSO: 3620/182

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

MBB, KRAUSS-MAFFEI MERGER PLANS ANALYZED, CRITICIZED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Dec 84 p 14

[Commentary by J. Juergen Jeske: "Bavarian Maneuvering in Field of Arms Production"]

[Text] For months there has been maneuvering for control of a company--the Krauss-Maffei, Inc of Munich, which arose from the merger of two locomotive works rich in traditions. But it is not such reminiscences that give this case a significance far beyond pure economics. Crucial is the fact that the company, which is at present part of the Flick concern, has been the general enterprise for one of the largest arms procurement programs of the federal army--the production of the Leopard tank. The antiaircraft tank "Gepard" is being built here too. To put in casual language, Krauss-Maffei is one of the two big German "tank smithies"; the other is the Krupp MaK Machine-building Ltd in Kiel, which is likewise playing a major role in producing the Leopard.

The aerospace concern Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm Ltd (MBB) in Ottobrunn near Munich would now like to acquire as large a share of Krauss-Maffei as possible with the support of the Bavarian state government; it is especially interested in assuming "industrial leadership". Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, which is well-known as a coproducer of the Airbus plane is also involved in military technology. The firm is building the "Tornado" fighter plane and a series of guided missiles. The chairman of the supervisory board is Bavarian Finance Minister Streibl; the chairman of the board is former Flick associate Vogels, who knows Krauss-Maffei as no one else does, because he once was chairman of its supervisory board.

The maneuvering for Krauss-Maffei has many aspects. One of these is Flick's declaration that he has approached no one about selling Krauss-Maffei, that others have approached him. It was not he who called public attention to the subject but others. No one knows for sure whether that is true or not--as is always the case if one is talking about the Flick concern. Anything is possible; much is likely. Some of the numerous rumors surrounding this case have certainly been planted to improve negotiating positions. The alleged interest of the British Vickers concern in the German arms concern--thus the supposedly threatening sale of German military technology to foreigners--could be such a rumor, just like the talk that Flick is being forced to sell for financial reasons. Only one thing is certain: The chances of a Flick company

to continue to be a weapons provider for the state have been reduced to a minimum by the Flick scandal.

Even more important than these conjectures are the fundamental questions: Is such concentration in industry necessary? Does the Federal Republic need a huge military technology concern that would come into existence through the merger of MBB and Krauss-Maffei? What kind of industrial policy is Bavaria pursuing and what is its relationship to the economic policies of the federal government? To anticipate: An armaments colossus on the Isar is undesirable for several reasons. The "Bavarian solution" now under consideration has justifiably roused the resistance of the antitrust office, the ministry of defense and even industry itself. The supervisory board of MBB should bear this in mind this week.

For reasons of competition, it is impossible to approve of a solution, whatever its specifics, which enables the MBB to assume the "industrial leadership" at Krauss-Maffei, that is to say, to gain power. It is true that the company would "only" change concerns; there would be no loss of independence to lament, but the most important aspect of the case is the concentration of arms technology. Thus Munich would have by far the largest German arms concern, which would further improve its dominant market position in air force and army technology. Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm head Vogels talks of the famous "synergy" effects that this merger would have. Even that, however, should not be allowed to invalidate misgivings about the effects on competition any more than the often cited jobs argument. Besides, many smaller arms producers consider the aerospace concern MBB, which was put together according to similar recipes at the end of the 70's, to already be too big, bureaucratic and inflexible. People are acting as if MBB--whatever its makeup--were the only savior of Krauss-Maffei. That is unconvincing; there must be better solutions.

The Defense Ministry is also horrified--and quite understandably so--at the thought of an "arms Moloch". The new concern would not be able to dictate prices, but there would be one less negotiating partner with all the negative consequences that this would have for military procurement policies. The Moloch would be even more dependent on state contracts. That would contradict the views of the Federal Government that German arms manufacturers must produce sufficient amounts of civilian goods to compensate for their military involvement. Finally, the danger that such a formation might develop its own momentum would increase. The desire to export weapons might grow stronger.

One of the most interesting questions is what kind of industrial policy Bavaria is pursuing. As has already been played out in other instances, a state of the Federal Republic doubtlessly wishes to make jobs secure. For the Leopard project with Krauss-Maffei will be completed in 1987 and the Tornado project with MBB in 1988. Thousands of jobs are at stake. Besides, the handwriting of Bavarian Prime Minister Strauss is once more clear, and Strauss has mercantilistic leanings. He has never concealed his approval of the partnership of state and industry in the area of arms production and in developing new technologies as is the case in France. With his pronounced instinct for political power, Strauss is touching on the as yet unanswered question of how to ensure the status of the Federal Republic as an industrial nation.

His line, however, opposes the basic systemic principle of the Federal Republic. To put it bluntly, by advocating the acquisition of Krauss-Maffei by M.B. Bavaria is supporting the creation of a kind of "industrial sector concern" as was suggested by former SPD Economics Minister Schiller. Meanwhile there have been enough warning examples of this. If Flick really wishes to sell Krauss-Maffei, other solutions must be sought. One should rely on entrepreneurial imagination. Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm's taking over Krauss-Maffei is not desirable.

9873

CSO: 3620/183

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

TRADE SURPLUS HEADING TOWARD ALL-TIME RECORD

September Figure Second Highest

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 23 Oct 84 p 21

[Text] The exporting of Finnish products increased in record fashion in September and the trade balance surplus grew by over an additional billion markkas. The total foreign trade surplus for January-September was 4.1 billion markkas, whereas a year ago the trade balance showed a 1.2-billion-markka deficit.

According to the September foreign trade review, the value of our exports was fully 7 billion markkas. This was the highest figure for a single month so far. Especially Finnish paper industry, chemical industry and agricultural products made sales abroad in January-September. For example, chemical industry export volume increased 28 percent and the value of paper industry exports rose by a fourth in comparison with the same period last year.

Total export value was 59 billion markkas in January-September and imports totaled 54.9 billion markkas. In comparison with last year the value of exports increased 17 percent and that of imports 7 percent. Therefore, the value of September exports was 7 billion and that of imports 5.9 billion markkas. According to the Customs Administration foreign trade balance review, the value of September exports increased 27 percent over last year's, but import value declined by one-tenth.

During the first part of the year export value increased the most, that is, by a fifth in the third quarter. During the first quarter export growth amounted to 18 percent and 15 percent in the second quarter.

The value of paper industry, chemical industry and agricultural exports increased most sharply during the first part of the year.

In January-September the value of paper industry exports was a fourth more than a year ago. The value of cellulose exports was 28 percent higher than a year ago and that of paper and cardboard 23 percent higher.

Lumber industry exports rose 5 percent in value. According to the Customs Administration a distinct drop in exports of prefabricated wooden houses slowed down the growth of industry exports. The value of lumber exports increased 17 percent and that of plywood 5 percent.

The value of metal industry exports increased 15 percent in January-September. Basic metal industry export volume, which was a fifth greater than last year's, increased the most. The value of metal products and machine industry exports rose by more than a tenth. A third, that is, 5.7 percent of the industry's exports, consisted of ship exports.

Eleven Percent Export Rise

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Nov 84 p 36

[Text] During the third quarter export volume was 11 percent higher than a year ago and import volume was 2 percent higher. Compared with the previous quarter, export volume dropped 4 percent while import volume remained the same. Export volume rose 10 percent in January-September and import volume 2 percent.

According to the number-one value index, during the third quarter of the year both export and import prices were 3 percent higher than in the previous quarter. Export prices rose 8 percent above those of the corresponding quarter last year and import prices rose 5 percent. In January-September export prices were on the average 6 percent and import prices 4 percent higher than a year earlier.

During the third quarter export volume rose the most in the metal product and machine industries as well as in the textile, clothing and leather industries. There were also increases in the paper and chemical industries. The export volume of food, beverage and tobacco industry exports was, on the other hand, lower than last year.

During this quarter paper industry export volume was a little less than 9 percent higher than last year and 13 percent higher in January-September. Paper export volume rose 13 percent in comparison with last year during the quarter and cardboard and pasteboard rose 3 percent. Cellulose export volume remained at last year's level.

Because of the strong growth of imports in the first part of the year, the volume of fuel and lubricant imports in January-September was 5 percent higher than last year.

During the quarter the volume of capital goods imports was 8 percent lower than last year and 2 percent lower in January-September.

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CSO: 3617/23

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

SMALLER CEMA COUNTRIES SEEK JOINT VENTURES TO BALANCE TRADE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 16 Oct 84 p 21

[Text] During the past decade trade between Finland and Europe's smaller CEMA countries has clearly developed more slowly than expected when the broad basis for agreements was created.

Joint ventures are, nevertheless, being promoted with different CEMA countries. They will be extensively examined the next time at the 12th annual conference of the Finland-CEMA Joint Commission to be held in Helsinki in mid-November.

There are joint projects especially in the forest and lumber industries and in the metallurgy and chemical industries. The CEMA Commission's Machine Construction Committee also has a bundle of projects for the development of industrial cooperation in process control technology, food industry machines and environmental protection technology.

Big improvements in trade between Finland and the smaller CEMA countries are, however, not to be expected.

Despite economic, technical and industrial cooperation and the KEVSOS [expansion unknown] agreements, Finland's imports from the smaller CEMA countries, for example, accounted for 2.8 percent of all imports last year and exports to them for 1.6 percent of the total value of Finnish exports. Our trade with Italy alone was greater.

Except for Poland, trade with the smaller CEMA countries is pretty much in balance. Most of this trade is developed as clearing-based bilateral trade.

Recently, to be sure, we finally switched to free hard currency trade with Hungary and the free hard currency experiment with Czechoslovakia and Poland is being continued.

After Poland, which supplies Finland with coal, our second largest trading partner among the smaller CEMA countries is the GDR. The total trade with the latter will amount to some 800 million markkas this year.

The GDR has mentioned lumber projects with Enso and metallurgy projects with Outokumpu as specific joint projects. They have already negotiated with Enso on one pulp plant and the improvement of one plant. As for Outokumpu, it is an old trading partner; the Kokkola cobalt plant's important raw material is a waste product of the GDR's metallurgy industry.

Trade Between Finland and the Smaller (European) CEMA Countries (in millions of markkas)

<u>Year</u>		<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
1970	total	395	331
	less GDR	70.9	79.3
1975	total	1,109.6	674.6
	less GDR	205.6	161
1980	total	1,969.3	1,196.2
	less GDR	528.1	331.2
1983	total	2,003.1	1,108.5
	less GDR	440.9	374

11,466

CSO: 3617/23

ECONOMIC

NETHERLANDS

BUSINESS NOT SUFFERING FROM TECHNOLOGY EMBARGO

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 30 Nov 84 p 9

[Article by Ben Van Der Velden: "Technology Embargo to Eastern Europe Does Not Harm Business"]

[Text] The Hague, November 30 - The embargo put on technology exports to Eastern Europe by COCOM last July hardly harms Dutch business. State-secretary Bolkestein said this yesterday during a confidential meeting with the Parliamentary Foreign Trade Commission.

COCOM is the Paris based organization of 14 NATO countries and Japan that controls the exports of strategic products to the Warsaw Pact countries and China. Last summer COCOM agreed on a list of products that cannot be exported to Eastern Europe because they can be used for military purposes. The list was adapted to the latest technological developments.

Yesterday, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Foreign Trade) Bolkestein said that he had not received any complaints from businesses concerning the consequences of this embargo. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is still conducting an official investigation into the potential damage that Dutch business may suffer from the COCOM agreement.

Bolkestein also announced that next year in the United States he would once again voice his objections against a possible tightening up of the exports administration law. The issue is that the United States might refuse to allow products containing American technology to be exported from another country to Eastern Europe.

The secretary of state for foreign trade also did not convince the Parliamentary Commission that his views on this matter would not clash with those of Mr Van Eekelen, his colleague at Foreign Trade. Members of parliament who were pleased with Bolkestein's unambiguous position on the issue of the exports administration law pointed out that Foreign Affairs "very traditionally" considers it "awkward to say something rotten about the United States."

They thought that protests against the possibility that the United States may want to treat own products abroad in accordance with American legislation have nothing to do with the friendly relations with that country. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Van Eekelen said last summer that relations with Washington are too delicate for a trade dispute.

12861

CSO: 3614/45

ECONOMIC

NORWAY

HIGH DOLLAR, OIL EARNINGS CREATE CURRENCY SURPLUS PROBLEM

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 11 Dec 84 p 10

[Article: 'Oslo Looking for New Ways to Dispose of Currency Surplus: Norway/ Foreign Exchange Reserves Have Risen Very Sharply']

[Text] Oslo---The foreign exchange reserves of the Norwegian central bank have increased so sharply on account of unexpected oil revenues brought about by the high rate of exchange of the dollar that Finance Minister Rolf Presthus has now enjoined it to invest a part of its reserves in long-term foreign issues and in commercial banks in Norway.

In the middle of November, the currency reserves of the central bank were 82 billion Norwegian crowns (DM 28 billion), almost double the amount at the beginning of last year. Presthus thinks that it is more than sufficient if the liquid currency reserves amount to the value of goods imported during 4 to 5 months. Under present conditions that means 55 to 70 billion Norwegian crowns (DM 19 to 24 billion).

At present the amount is 72 billion Norwegian crowns (DM 25 billion) and thus above the limit that Presthus considers advisable. The central bank in Oslo holds about 9 billion Norwegian crowns (DM 3 billion) in longer-term securities with higher yields. The central bank should be increasing that amount somewhat fairly soon. It should also be making currency deposits at Norwegian commercial banks in the amount of approximately 3 billion Norwegian crowns (DM 1 billion). According to the rules of the International Monetary Fund, such deposits are not considered in the computation of official currency reserves.

This year Oslo has taken several steps to master the problem of the influx of currency. Oil and gas production has, as a result of favorable conditions, risen by more than a tenth and ought to reach about 60 million tons of oil units for the whole year. That would bring the state tax revenues of almost 40 billion Norwegian crowns (DM 14 billion) and cause a balance of payments surplus that the Finance Ministry estimates at 27.5 billion Norwegian crowns (DM 9.4 billion).

Above all, the government wishes to facilitate the investment of monies abroad. In the summer it permitted Norwegians to acquire shares of stocks

quoted on foreign markets, lifted limits on currency available for traveling and for purchasing vacation homes outside Norway. The opportunities for Norwegian banks and insurance companies to grant loans to foreigners were enlarged in the fall, and Norwegians can also purchase foreign bonds to a limited extent.

But Oslo has shrunk from complete liberalization of the flow of capital to and from the country. Thus in November foreign investors were no longer permitted to buy high-yield Norwegian bonds because in the 6 weeks up to the middle of November such purchases had brought about an influx of roughly 3 billion Norwegian crowns (DM 1 billion) and thus an undesirable expansion of the money supply.

Now the Norwegian government is seeking new ways to reduce its large currency reserves. "Norway must now and then invest funds in foreign countries to counter domestic inflation pressures, and one way is to invest in foreign companies," declares Prime Minister Willoch. A special group of experts under the direction of the ministry of industry is researching the question how the "private competence" of the weakly capitalized Norwegian companies can be combined with the currency wealth of the public sector.

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